December 2004 - January 2005

Practice attempts at some old exam questions.

*****
SCIENTIFIC LAW
*****

What is a law of science?
How do laws of science differ from other types of generalizations?  How does
science go about determining whether a generalization is a law?

First, what are some laws of science?  Examples include Kepler's laws of
celestial motion, Galileo's laws of terrestrial motion, Newton's laws of
motion, the laws of thermodynamics, Ohm's law, Maxwell's equations,
Einstein's law of gravity, etc.  Some laws are constants (like Avogadro's
number, universal gravitation constant G, speed of light c) or quantitative
expressions (like F=ma, PV=nRT).  Others are qualitative.

A law of science is a generalization of (approximate) truth, but it is more
than just a generalization. A law is a generalization that holds universally
(at all places and times, at least within a range of conditions, ceteris
paribus), holds necessarily (not merely contingently/accidentally), and that
supports counterfactuals (subjunctive conditionals, "if sharks were mammals,
they would have lungs").

Laws, it is said, express natural regularities which hold invariably and
without exception. Laws unify phenomena and other laws.  Laws often point to
underlying causal connections.  The law of gravity doesn't just generalize
other laws; it seems to point to an underlying cause for those laws.  Laws
provide explanations.  (According to Hempel's covering model or
deductive-nomological/I-S model of scientific explanation, explanations
require laws.)

How does one determine whether a generalization is law-like (nomological)?
Laws are testable.  By testing, by trying to falsify (Popper) the law.  See
how the law compares not just with already-known data/observations, but with
all future observations and all logically possible observations.  Use the
law to make predictions (the more novel the better) and see if the
predictions hold.  If not, so much for the law.  Consider thought
experiments.  Do the consequences of the law lead to logical absurdity (in
the reductio sense)?

Laws are useful in that they provide explanations and also in that they can
be projected, that is they allow us to make predictions.  Laws are
well-tested, confirmed, and have been accepted by the general scientific
community.  Laws are essentially provisional; they can be revised.

[The rest of this needs to be integrated.]

According to the epistemic regularity theory (Ayer et al), the distinction
between generalizations of law and generalizations of fact lies in the
attitude of those who believe the propositions.  Generalizations of fact are
not so certain, and their destruction is not unexpected; exceptions destroy
generalizations of fact.  In contrast, laws are not destroyed by exceptions.
When there is a discrepancy between observation and an established law,
scientists consider the possibility of observational error or that there is
something else going on (such as the existence of another planet).  Laws may
be revised, but they are seldom abandoned.

For Dretske, laws are not universal generalization of the form
"for all X, if X if F then X is G', but rather a law is a singular statement
about universals: "F-ness necessarily yields G-ness".

(Refer to Ayer and Dretske in Curd, Laws of nature in Companion, and Laws in
Rosenberg to flush out some details, also Kuhn and Duhem for examples of
laws.)

*****
UNDERDETERMINATION
*****

Quine says that "physical theory is underdetermined even by all possible
observations ... Phiysical theories can be at odds with each other and yet
compatible with all possible data in the broadest sense.  In a word, they
can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent."  What is the
argument for this claim?  Of what significance is it the philosophy of
science?

"Experimental evidence can at most show that a theory holds to a certain
level of approximation.  But any number of disparate theories can conform to
all experimental evidence within any given level of approximation. 
Therefore, experimental evidence alone can never even justify the adoption
of any one theory from the myriad of comparably accurate alternatives to it,
much less establish its truth."  Of what significance is this contention to
the philosophy of science?  Is it correct?

Any number of disparate theories can conform to all experimental evidence
within any given level of approximation.  Therefore, experimental evidence
alone can never even justify the adoption of any one theory from the myriad
of comparably accurate alternatives to it, much less establish its truth.

An infinite number of curves can be fitted to a set of points, but some
curves are better than others; evidence alone cannot justify the adoption,
so some other factors are needed; I don't think the truth needs to be
established to adopt a theory; holism, Quine-Duhem.

Companion, Underdetermination of Theory by Data (and my thoughts)

There are many different theses that go by the name of underdetermination.
Roughly, underdetermination is the claim that multiple theories fit
observation, or that it is possible to make changes in theory without there
being a corresponding change in observation.

Weak underdetermination of theories is the claim that two theories can both
fit equally well to the observational data available at a particular point
in time.  This is relatively uncontroversial, and the status of the
Ptolemaic, Tychonic, and Copernican world views as of 1600 is a standard
example.  Even when observational data cannot determine between two
theories, there can still be pragmatic reasons to prefer/accept one theory
over the over (as arguably can be seen with the Tychonic and Copernican
theories in 1633).  Weak underdetermination is often illustrated as a curve
fit; multiple curves fit a set of data points.  

[See Kuhn's "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice" in C&C, also
Pragmatic in Companion.]

(Duhem: "An infinity of different theoretical facts may be taken for the
translation of the same practical fact." 134; "The physicist can never
subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group
of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions,
what he learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this
group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not
designate which one should be changed." 187)

The thesis of strong underdetermination is far more controversial:  Perhaps
theories are underdetermined not just by the observations available at a
given point in time, but by all possible observations.  Perhaps, even were
all possible observational data to be available, every theory would have at
least one alternative (inconsistent) theory which is observationally
(predictively) equivalent.  

Realists, of course, must deny strong underdetermination, or else we have no
grounds for thinking that we are adopting truer and truer theories. 
Instrumentalists often appeal to strong underdetermination to argue against
realism.  This is the real import of the thesis: if true, it presents a
decisive blow to realism (we can't get to the truth).  This leads to
skepticism and/or instrumentalism.  A second import of the thesis is that
SUT implies WUT, suggesting that we need to look beyond empirical
considerations for understanding theory choice (and whether theory choice is
rational, see Kuhn).

Strong underdetermination has had a number of proponents, including Duhem,
van Fraassen, and Quine (for a time).  Duhem's and Quine's
underdetermination (quite similar) theses are based on holism.  Duhem:
Experimental tests of theory also rely on auxillary background assumptions.
When experimental observation does not conform with the prediction given by
a theory, there is no way to determine which of the experiment's assumptions
should be rejected.  That is, falsification is vague and there can be no
crucial experiment.  Logic alone cannot tell scientists when to give up one
theory in favor of another (but logic and "good sense" combined can, Duhem
217).  Quine: Theories face the tribunal of observations as a whole. 
Adjustments/revisions can be made somewhere in the system to construct an
alternate system which, while logically icompatible with the first on a
theoretical level, is observationally equivalent.  Therefore,
observation/evidence do not determine/constrain theory choice.

Problems with strong underdetermination:  (1) Strong underdetermination
presupposes a dichotomy between the observable and the theoretical which
realists find unacceptable.  (2) Apparent cases of underdetermination may be
cases of equivocation, not genuine incompatibilities.  (3) There is no
threat of underdeterminism when one takes a less narrow view of empirical
evidence and allows pragmatic factors (e.g., simplicity) to play a role in
theory choice which is consistent with realism.  (4) There are no actual
cases in history of strong underdeterminism, so there is no reason to think
that it is true.  (5) Strong underdetermination relies on an incorrect
analogy with WUT and curve-fitting when having all points would uniquely
determine a curve. (6) Perhaps rivals can always be constructed by
modification (as Quine suggests), but these are easily recognizable as
artifices, not real theories. (7) Arguments for strong underdetermination
relying on holism may be question-beggingly circular.

[See Laudan's "Demystifying Underdetermination" particularly the section on
QUD in C&C and relevant commentary.]

Conclusion: Weak underdetermination is likely true, and unproblematically
so.  The thesis of strong underdetermination raises an interesting question
for consideration, but there is no reason to believe that the thesis is
true, rather than just a speculative conjecture.  However, if true, realism
is untenable, so both realists and instrumentalists must take it seriously.

From Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism":

"total experience is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are
experience.  A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions
readjustments in the interior of the field .... the total field is so
underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much
latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any
single contrary experience .... it is misleading to speak of the empirical
content of an individual statement .... Any statement can be held true come
what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system."

"[As the algebra of the irrational numbers is underdetermined by that of the
rationals,,] total science ... is underdetermined by experience. The edge of
the system must be kept squared with experience; the rest, with all its
elaborate myths or fictions, has as its objective the simplicity of laws."

(Refer to my notes to Pragmatic Factors and Underdetermination in Companion,
also holism and Quine in Companion; C&C chapter 3, particularly Duhem,
Quine, Laudan, and commentary)

*****
REDUCTIONISM
*****

1) "Reductionism" is a pejorative term often applied by self-styled "holists"
and "anti-reductionists" to various schools of scientific thought; yet, the
"reduction" of cellular biology to chemistry, or chemistry to physics, is at
the same time held up as a triumph of modern science.  Describe varieties of
reductionism, and evaluate some of the main arguments for and against
reductionism.

From Silberstein, "Reduction, Emergence and Explanation" in Blackwell Guide
The question: Can everything be reduced to the fundamental constituents of
the world or are there non-reducible emergent entities, properties, and
laws?

Rough characterizations first: Silberstein surveys both ontological and
epistemological varieties of reduction and emergence.  Ontological -- Can
everything in the world be nothing but (or determined by) fundamental
constituents of reality?  Epistemological -- Can all our scientific theories
be identified with theories about the most fundamental features of the  
world?  Reductionism -- the best understanding of a complex system is at the
leverl of structure, behavior, and laws of its component parts (and
relations).  Emergentism -- the whole is something more than the sum of its
parts and has properties that cannot be understood in terms of the
properties of the parts.

4 varieties of ontological reductionism: Elimination (recognition that what    
we thought were Xs are really just Ys and can be eliminated, demonic
possession). Identity (we continue to accept Xs but see that they are
identical with or special sorts of Ys, heat is just kinetic molecular
energy, genes are just functionally active DNA sequences, see Kemeny and
Oppenheim). Mereological/Humean supervenience (properties of the whole are
determined by the intrinsic properties of the parts such as mass, charge,
and spin). Nomological supervenience/determination (fundamental laws of
physics, rather than properties, necessitate/determine special science
laws).

4 varieties of epistemological reduction: Replacement (prior way of
describing the world drops out in favor of a newer more adequate way of
representing reality). Theoretical-derivational (derivation of one theory,
or approximation thereof, to another constitutes an explanation,
thermodynamics reduces to statistical mechanics, see Nagel for and
Feyerabend against). Semantic/model-theoretic (theories are not linguistic
entities but families of mathematical models, reduction is an isomorphism  
between models). Pragmatic (reduction is a pragmatic matter, if a lower
level theory is more explanatory and predictive than a higher level theory
of the same domain, it is an intertheoretic reduction, see Van Fraassen).

Curd & Cover commentary:

Examples of reduction -- reduction of Galileo and Kepler's laws to Newton's
gravitation theory; reduction of classical thermodynamics to statistical
mechanics; reduction of optics to electromagnetic theory; reduction of
classical genetics to molecular biology; perhaps even conceivably a
reduction of biology to chemistry to physics.

Nagel -- Nagel discusses intertheoretic reduction (sounds like ontological
theoretical-derivational reduction).  To say theory T reduces to T' is to
say that the laws of T can be derived from those of T'.  The theories must
be in correspondence as follows: they must be logically consistent and where
there are shared terms they must have a common meaning.  As Feyerabend and
others point out, the consistency clause is problematic as history shows
inconsistencies between theories in cases of alleged reduction (Kepler to
Newton).   Homogeneous reductions are those where all the terms of T are in
T'.  Inhomogeneous reductions are those were some terms of T are not terms
in T'; in such cases bridge laws are needed to connect the terms.

Nickles -- Nagel treats reduction as if it were a single thing, but it's
not.  There are at least two kinds of reduction, r1 and r2.  r1 involves the
reduction between a narrower less fundamental theory T and a broader more
fundamental theory T', where T is consolidated by T'.  r2 is reduction of
the broader theory to a narrower theory under some limiting transformation
(special relativity reducing to classical mechanics in the limit of low
velocities).

Kitcher -- Kitcher considers genetics, claiming that standard reductionist
accounts do not capture the relation between theories in biology.  In
particular, classical genetics does not contain laws that are derivations
from molecular genetics, cannot have its vocabulary linked by suitable
bridge laws, and does not have its laws explained by their derivation from
molecular genetics; the commonality here is that laws are, in comparison
with physics, absent from biology, so the standard account does not apply.
Nonetheless, Kitcher contributions molecular genetics makes to classical
genetics, in particular to gene replication (presupposition), mutation
(conceptual refinement), and sickle-cell anemia (explanatory extension).

Notes from "Who's Afraid of Reductionism?" p80-83 in DDI: The term
"reductionism" gets used as an insult.  Reduction of sciences: biology gets
reduced to chemistry gets reduced to physics.  The uncontroversial reading
of this claim is that of unification; the preposterous reading (greedy
reductionism) is that the higher level be replaced with the lower level.  
Darwin's idea promises to unite and explain, not to explain away minds,
purposes, and meanings; proper reductionist explanations leave the higher
level still standing but "demystified, unified, placed on more secure
foundations".

And from CE p454-455: When we learn that gold is just that with a certain
number particles, "we may feel cheated or angry -- those physicists have
explained something away: The goldness is gone from gold".  "Leaving
something out is not a feature of failed explanations, but of successful
explanations." Reliance on "then a miracle occurs" is no explanation.

And from "Quining Qualia": "my contention that there is no secure foundation
in ordinary 'folk psychology' for a concept of qualia. We normally think in
a confused and potentially incoherent way when we think about the ways   
things seem to us." Qualia, then, explain nothing, and "explaining away
qualia" is (I think) a gain rather than a loss.

2) One might say that colors have been explained, but ghosts have been
explained away.  Aristotle considered telos ("final cause") or purpose as   
one of the four fundamental aitia or causes.  Darwin's theory of evolution  
by natural selection is often said to provide a reduction of the apparent   
purpose in nature to purposeless mechanism.  Is this explanation like the
explanation of color or ghosts?  Has Darwin shown that there is no purpose,
or has he shown how to explain real purpose?

One might say that colors have been explained, but ghosts have been
explained away.  Aristotle considered telos ("final cause") or purpose as
one of the four fundamental aitia or causes.  Darwin's theory of evolution
by natural selection is often said to provide a reduction of the apparent
purpose in nature to purposeless mechanism.  Is this explanation like the
explanation of color or ghosts?  Has Darwin shown that there is no purpose,
or has he shown how to explain real purpose?

Many explanations are reductionist, but they are not all reductionist in the
same way.  Silberstein discusses four varieties on ontological and four
varieties of epistemological reductionism (elimination, identity,
merological supervenience, nomological supervenience; replacement,
theoretical-derivational, semantic/model-theoretic, pragmatic).

The reductionist explanation of color seems to be that of ongological
identity.  Color maps very well to frequency/wavelength, and our perception
can be understood in terms of the function of the eye.  We continue to
accept that there's color but see that colors are identical to light of
specific frequencies/wavelengths.  (Other examples of this kind of
reductionism: heat as kinetic molecular energy and genes as functionally
active DNA sequences.) On the epistemological side, we see an intertheoretic
reduction of theories about color to theories about light.  Explanations
involving color can be rephrased in terms of explanations about light. (Note
that not all explanations need to be so rephrased; some explanations may be
more useful phrased in terms of color, but we recognize that regardless of
the terms used, color and light are the same.) Some may say that color has
been explained away, but I do not believe that it has been; it has been
explained, not explained away.

In contrast when we explain, or rather explain away, ghosts, we do not find
something else which we can map onto the ghosts.  Instead we find that in
the instances where we relied on ghosts for (surely mysterious and confused)
explanation (eg, strange lights in the swamp are caused by will o' the
wisp), we now have found something else to rely on and provide a better
explanation (eg, "the light is caused by decaying matter that turns into
luminescent gases").  There is no direct relationship between will o' the
wisps and the decay process; they are not identical.  Ghosts are explained
away; they are eliminated from our ontology and explanations relying on them
replaced.

Some opponents of reductionism object that the latter is not a case of
explanation, but one of explaining away.  However, it seems to me that the
ghosts were no explanation at all and that explaining them away is part of
an explanation.  (Dennett says similar things about qualia.) Similarly, when
a child learns that Santa doesn't go to every house in one night, but rather
that his parents leave presents, this is an explanatory gain.  It is an
explanatory gain because it just doesn't make sense that one person (even
with the elves) can travel at those speeds, etc.  Santa has been explained
away.

Even if one accepts that ghosts are worth explaining away, one may be upset
at the loss of Santa (the loss of some of the magic of Christmas).
Opponents of reductionism fear that reductionist explanations are taking
away all of those things that we want; they feel "cheated or angry", they   
believe that reductionism is a "universal acid" that will destory everything 
they hold dear (Dennett).

Opponents of reduction may also misunderstand that there are different kinds
of reductionism and worry that worry that all reductions are "greedy
reductions", the kind that explain away.  But as we have seen, the
explanation of color is a reduction of the non-greedy sort.

So what of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection?  Does it
explain telos/final cause/purpose (as the theories of light and perception
explain color)?  Or does it explain away telos (as ghosts are explained
away)?  

[I think the rest of this is pretty weak.]
                                                            
Many opponents to the theory of evolution by natural selection worry that   
the theory explains away purpose, design, and intentionality.  "Darwin's
dangerous idea is that Design can emerge from mere Order via an algorithmic 
process that makes no use of pre-existing Mind" (DDI, 83).  Before Darwin's
theory, one might answer the question "Why are our bodies symmetrical" with
something like "Because God chose us to be in this aesthetically pleasing
way." Similarly, the question "Why are we here?" might be answered "For
God's purpose, to help others, ...." If we are designed by an intentional
designer (God), then we have purpose, the purpose for which we were
deisgned.  Instead, Darwin's theory tells us that there is no intentional
design.  We are not the products of some wise creator, but rather the
products of an intentionless mechanical process.

However, I think that invoking God was no real explanation for our existence 
and behavior.  Darwin's theory gives an account of how we came to be here   
(which is what we really wanted all along) that does not refer to telos in
the sense of an intentional purpose for which we are here.

From DDI 23-25:  Aristotle identified four aitia or causes (material,
formal, efficient, and telos/final).  Telos/teleology is associated with why
questions, questions of purpose, goal, end, raison d'etre (reason for
being).

"A teleological explanation is one that explains the existence or occurrence
of something by citing a goal or purpose that is served by the thing."
Artifacts/tools such as hammers have obvious/uncontroversial telos or
intended/designed function.  The idea is that just as hammers exist for our 
purposes, "our purposes are ultimately God's purposes."  Of course, this
still leaves the mystery "what are God's purposes?" .... 

"Does the universe exist for any reason?  Do reasons play an intelligible
role in the explanations of the cosmos?  Could something exist for a reason
without its being somebody's reason? Or are reasons ... only appropriate in
explanations of the works and deeds of people or other rational agents? ...
One of Darwin's most fundamental contributions is showing us a new way to   
make sense of 'why' questions."          

(Refer to Silberstein in Blackwell Guide, Curd section 8, Dennett, Companion
reduction, supervenience, teleological explanation, unity?)

*****
INDUCTION
*****

Philosophers have come to view inductive reasoning as raising two worries,
the classic "problem of induction" posed by Hume and the so-called "new
riddle of induction" posed by Goodman.  What precisely are these two
problems?  How, if at all, is each of them germane to doing science and to
giving a philosophic account of what science accomplishes?

In an attempt to understand induction, philosophers have puzzled over Hume's
problem of induction and Goodman's new riddle of induction.  Roughly, these
ask whether the use of inductive inferences is ever rationally justified and 
in which specific cases the use of inductive inferences is justified. These
problems are of special import to science because it seems, contra Popper's
claim, that scientific practices depend on induction.  If the problems of 
induction cannot be answered, science rests on shaky grounds.   

In particular, inductive generalizations play a direct role in the notions
of corroboration, causal claims, and laws (are there regularities in nature,
and how can we find them?).  An understanding of induction can help to
clarify these notions.  The problems of induction may also be seen to
underly or be similar in structure to other problems in the philosophy of
science, notably the thesis of underdetermination of theory by data.  A
study of the problems of induction may suggest answers or approaches to
these problems.

Are we justified in believing that the unobserved will be like the observed,
that the future will be like the past; in other words, are we justified in
believing in the uniformity of nature and inductive inferences?  Hume
famously says no; we observe "constant connections", but nothing more. Why
should inductive inferences be considered rationally justified from a
philosophical/epistemic standpoint?

Many philosophers have offered answers: Russell and BonJour say induction
can be justified on a purely a priori basis.  Mill says the assumption of
uniformity of nature is too deeply embedded in our thinking to be
questioned.  Strawson suggests that it is absurd to look for deductive
justification of the inductive inference which is a reasoning of a different
kind; accepting the inductive inference "without proof" is as reasonable as
accepting the deductive inference.  Braithwaite and Skyrms give arguments
that induction can be non-circularly justified on inductive grounds.
Reichenbach views induction not as an inference but as a pragmatic
probabilistic (long run frequency) method. Peirce, Dewey, and Quine hold
pragmatic and/or naturalized views in which we are justified in using
induction because we are better off with it (have a better chance of
survival).  Popper sidesteps the problem of induction entirely, holding that
the scientific method relies on falsification rather than induction.
(Largely taken from Scruton and Epistemology Companion)

Inductive generalizations are ampliative, going beyond what is known from
some/observed/past instances to all/unobserved/future instances.

Conclusions of inductive inferences are not perfectly reliable in the way
conclusions of inductive inferences are.  Inductive arguments entail
likelihood (high degrees of probability), not deductive certainty.  The
conclusions are likely true, but are not necessarily true; they may be
false.

Observations do not deductively entail predictions; a single set of
observations can equally entail multiple predictions.  Theories/conclusions
based on inductive inferences are underdetermined by premises/evidence.  If
inductive inferences can (equally) lead to different (contradictory)
conclusions, how can reliance on such inferences be rational?
 
Importance of justifying inductive inference is that science (it seems)
relies on induction.
 
Attemps at justification of the inductive inference which rely on the
inductive inference itself (or the principle of uniformity of nature, as in
induction will work because it has in the past) seem (in general) to be
question-beggingly circular.
 
The hypothetico-deductive model relies on induction in that successful
predictions are taken as support of the theory.  Note that confirmation is
by degree; further positive instances make a theory more likely, but not
certain.
 
Hempel's raven paradox: If the observation of a black raven is some support
that all ravens are black, then by contraposition so should the observation
of a white swan (non-black non-raven).

Goodman: not all sets of positive inferences cause us to make inductive
inferences; only some seem natural, projectible, entrenched (black ravens
and green, but not bearded philosophers and grue).  (Largely from Lipton's
_Inference to the Best Explanation_)

Broad says induction is the "glory of science" but "scandal of philosophy".
 
Russell says the general principles of science (meaning the important
notions of law and causality) depend on induction.
 
Inductive inferences are those which pass from singular statements to
universal statements.  The inductive principle is not an analytic truth nor
a priori (as Kant suggests) and attempts at justifying the inductive
principle lead to infinite regress.  There is no justification for the
inductive inference.  This is not a problem for science, however, because
the inductive inference is not actually needed.  Instead, Popper proposes
that theory testing involves falsification and corroboration of degree, but
not verification.  There is no such thing as inductive confirmation; no
scientific theory or law is made probable by evidence.  Scientific method
involves proposing conjectures and attmepting to falsify them.  Popper's
falsification is no longer a seriously-held view.  Relevant criticism of the
claim that the scientific method is deductivist (rather than inductivist)
include Salmon's attack that an explanation of rational prediction (that is, 
why we should rely on corroborated theories) requires relying on inductive
confirmation.  (From Popper's "Problem of Induction" in C&C)

Old riddle: Why are we justified in accepting any inductive generalizations
as true?  New riddle: Why are we justified in accepting some, but not all,
inductive generalizations as true?

Goodman's new riddle of induction: A large number of emeralds are observed
prior to time t and are all found to be green.  By inductive generalization,
all emeralds (including those to be examined after time t) are green.  But
by parallel construction, the observed emeralds have been found to be "grue"
(where grue means "green before time t, blue thereafter), and so all
emeralds are grue.  This leads to the absurd conclusion that emeralds after
time t are both green and blue.  Somehow we want to say that the inductive
inference is valid in the green case but not the grue case, that green is
"projectible" but grue is not.  How can we make this distinction?

Goodman's answer is that the predicate green is more entrenched than grue.
Jeffrey's answer is that green is simpler than grue.  Carnap's answer is
that such temporal properties like grue are not projectible.  Achinstein's
answer is that disjunctive properties are not projectible.

It seems to me that all of these answers deal well with the "gruesome"
example itself, but there is a more general question.  Why are inductive
generalizations justified (or at least why do they seem to work) in some
cases but not in others?  Observing only black ravens and concluding that
all ravens are black seems rational in some way that observing only bearded
philosophers and concluding that all philosophers are bearded is not.  I
think (roughly) that we want to say that part of being a raven (natural
kind, essence, whatnot) involves being black, but that beardedness isn't
necessary to being a philosopher.  Thus we see that the import of Goodman's
riddle for science involves identifying those generalizations which point to
nomological/lawlike regularities.

(Mostly my own ideas, but also from C&C commentary on Goodman, Achinstein's
"The Grue Paradox", Laudan's "Demystifying Underdetermination, and Companion
to Epistemology)

(Refer to epistemology exam answers, Scruton's Modern Philosophy, problem of
induction in epistemology companion, Lipton and Popper in Curd, Curd
commentary for chapter 4 and grue in chapter 3, Popper & Achinstein in Routledge on
grue, Hume, Russell, Goodman, Broad)


*****
SUCCESS => REALISM
*****

One defense of scientific realism is that no other philosophical view
explains the remarkable successes of the mature theoretical sciences.
Explain why this defense does, or does not, merit being taken seriously.

Scientific realism is the claim that the unobservable entities postulated by
scientific theories exist and that claims about them are to be taken as
literally true (at least approximately).  One of the main arguments for
scientific realism is a retroductive argument from the success of science:
The only/best explanation for the success of science is realism.  More
explicitly: Science is (predictively) successful; it would be inexplicable
or a miracle for a theory to be instrumentally succesful but not actually
represent the world; therefore, the only/best explanation of the success of
science is realism.  This defense is held by Sellars, Smart, Harman, Putnam,
et. al.  Sellars: "to have good reason for holding a theory is ipso facto to
have good reason that the entities postulated by the theory exist." Putnam
(miracle argument or ultimate argument): "the positive argument for realism
is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a
miracle."

This defense should be taken seriously, but not too seriously.  Realists
should take this defense seriously because if it is sustainable against
objections it provides strong support for the realist position.  The
anti-realist as well must take this defense seriously because it cannot be
immediately dismissed without serious consideration.  After such
consideration, however, I think it is clear that the argument from success
is untenable.

Objections to the argument include: 1) the argument relies on an
abductive/retroductive inference -- inference to the best explanation -- and
such inferences are suspect, 2) it's not clear that science is that
successful since past theories which were then considered well-supported
were later found to be false, and we have no reason to believe our present
theories are any different and will not similarly fail, 3) theory is
underdetermined by observation, that is, many mutually inconsistent theories
can be equally successfully, but they cannot all be true, 4) realism is not
the only/best explanation of success.

Fine and abduction: The denfense falls prey to vicious circularity.
Abductive/retroductive inferences are of a different type than deductive
inferences.  The proponent of the defense from the success of science has
the burden of explaining why the inference to best explanation is justified.

Laudan and the pessimistic meta-induction: Though a realist, Laudan argues
against the defense from the success of science. Past theories (e.g.,
phlogiston) which were once considered to be well-supported have since
failed. Present theories are no different; despite their current success,
they are likely to be false.  History shows us that explanatory
success/virtue cannot justify belief in theory truth. (Objection: present
theories are better than past theories; we are converging on the truth)

Quine and the underdetermination thesis: For any explanatory theory, other
alternative empirically equivalent theories can be constructed.  This leads
to underdetermination -- no body of evidence supports a theory to the
exclusion of all rivals.  Explanatory success of a theory, then, cannot
point to truth since multiple incompatible theories can be successful.
(Objection: Quine's thesis may speak to local/weak underdetermination, but
not global/strong underdetermination which is the issue at hand.) [Possibly
I need to go into more detail with this paragraph, but that means more
reading.]

Van Fraassen's alternate explanation: Van Fraassen is a constructive  
empiricist (a non-instrumentalist anti-realist).  Roughly, he is agnostic
about the existence of and the veracity of claims about unobservables.  What
matters for van Fraassen empirical adequacy, that which is observable.  As
such, he offers an explanation for success which relies on empirical
adequacy, not on existence of unobservables and truth.  He says "the success
of current scientific theories is no miracle.  It is not even surprising to
the scientific (Darwinist) mind.  For any scientific theory is born into a
life of fierce competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw." Such
competition forces selection; the selection criterion for theories is
empirical adequacy.  "Only the successful theories survive".

I believe these objections, particular van Fraassen's, have crippled the
defense of realism from the success of science.  Neither the realist nor the
anti-realist should take this defeat too seriously, though, as it is the
defeat of only one argument for realism, not a defeat of realism itself.
Anti-realists and realists can abandon the argument from success, but still
argue over common causes, ontological simplicity, the aims of scientists,
how scientists speak about their theories, and a myriad of other claims.

(See Companion articles on inference to the best explanation, observation
and theory, realism and instrumentalism; Laudan's "Confutation of Convergent
Realism" in Routledge; van Fraassen's "Arguments Concerning Scientific
Realism" from _The Scientific Image_ in Curd & Cover)

*****
NEWTON
*****

1) In a passage that has provoked centuries of controversy, Newton remarks, "I
have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reasons for these
properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses.  For whatever is not
deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses,
whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or
mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy."  What is Newton
claiming here?  Is his claim tenable?

Breaking Newton's claim from the General Scholium apart, bit by bit:

"I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reasons for these
properties of gravity": Newton thinks he has been able to deduce from
phenomena the existence of gravity, but he admits that he has not found the
reasons for gravity and recognizes this as an area for future study.

"I do not feign hypotheses": This is the most famous part of the quote, as
it is surrounded by controversy with many (Leibniz, briefly Cotes, later
Duhem, Popper, and Lakatos) claiming that it's simply not true, that Newton
does in fact feign hypotheses (such as the theory of universal gravitation
and the existence of the gravitational force itself).  Newton firmly
believes his statement and does not believe he is hypocritical in doing so.
Understanding his defense requires picking apart his claim "hypotheses non
fingo", with the notions of both hypotheses and "fingo" (feign, frame,
fabricate) requiring clarification.

fingo: I think Newton is sometimes taken to mean that he doesn't make use of
hypotheses, but this is surely not correct.  There are hypotheses in The
Prinicipia.  However, Newton does not say he doesn't use hypotheses; he even
says they are useful for suggesting experiments.  His choice of the word
"fingo" ("feign" seems the best translation, in fact Koyre notes that Newton
had earlier used the word feign) is important and was not taken lightly by
Newton (who wrote and discarded several drafts, including "I flee from
hypotheses").  Newton's point is not that he doesn't use or make hypotheses,
but that he doesn't feign them, doesn't invent them as fictions.

"For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a
hypothesis": The second part to understand in "hypotheses non fingo" is what
is meant by hypothesis.  Here, as in a letter to Cotes, Newton states
clearly that hypotheses are not deduced from phenomena, but assumed without
experimental proof.  What Newton is objecting to, then, are fictions not
based on observation.  At the same time, he is saying that which is deduced
from phenomena, from experience, is stronger than hypotheses.  This sounds
like a rejection of rationalism and an endorsement of empiricism.  Newton is
suggesting that the science he engages in involves deduction from phenomena,
and that his universal graviation, being in part deduced from phenomena, is
something stronger than a hypothesis.

"and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult
qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy": Again,
there are two crucial notions here: the meaning of "experimental philosophy"
and an understanding of metaphysical, physical, occult, and mechanical.
Experimental philosophy is an empiricist's philosophy.  Experimental
philosophy should not include rationalist hypotheses.  Instead, it should
include claims reached only after -- and directly because of -- observation,
experimentation, confirmation, predictive success, and all that other
empirical good stuff.

As for metaphysical and occult, Newton seems to be responding pretty
directly to Leibniz [see occult question] and the Cartesian method.  With
physical and mechanical, I think Newton is clarifying (as in the scholium in
book 1 section 11) that he is doing some sort of theoretical
physics/dynamics, in other words, basically math.  He's not looking for the
causal underlying mechanism of gravity; instead, he's dealing with forces
which he treats as quantities, mathematical proportions.  This suggests a
new methodology for experimental philosophy/science.

Why is Newton so distrustful of hypotheses?  One reason is his recognition
of the underdetermination theses: multiple hypotheses/theories can fit
observation/data.  An armchair philosopher can dream up a hypothesis, but
this is not experimental philosophy.  Instead, Newton is suggesting that
conclusions (universal gravity) be reached from phenomena in such a way that
they are not just arbitrary approximations to true motion but idealizations
where circumstances in which they hold exactly can be specified and where
deviations are meaningful.  Abstract idealizations are to be studied
mathematically and then compared and refined with actual phenomena in a
process that can lead to further refinements and deductions.

So is Newton's claim that he does not feign hypotheses tenable?  I think
yes.  His laws of gravity are something more than hypothesis.  Gravity is
just just a fiction that Newton lept to; instead he got there through a
sequence of small steps of observational evidence and experimentation.
Newton's gravity is justified by a new methodology that Newton presents,
employs, and advocates in The Principia.

What exactly is his methodology?  He goes on in the General Scholium to say
that propositions are deduced from phenomena and made more general by
induction, and that this justification for existence/truth, not the
idenfication of underlying causes, is all we need.  "It is enough that
gravity really exists and acts according to the laws that we have set forth
and is sufficient to explain all the motions".  Newton's aim is (see
Shapiro) to develop a more certain science based on mathematical theories
and experimentally discovered properties.

(Aside: Duhem charges that Newton did to deduce universal gravitation
because his conclusion is inconsistent with its premises (eg Kepler's laws,
motion as an ellipse).  "The principal of universal gravity, very far from
being derivable by generalization and induction from the observational laws
of Kepler, formally contradicts these laws.  If Newton's theory is correct,
Kepler's laws are necessarily false." I think this misundersatnds Newton's
new method and the importance of refinement and the series of
approximations/idealizations.)

2) Leibniz objected to Newton's theory of gravity on the grounds that it can
explain nothing: for Newtonian gravity either invokes action at a distance,
in which case it requires a miracle of God, and it is trifling to explain
everything in this way; or it is an occult power, in which case to invoke
gravity is to invoke a mere name that explains nothing.  Is this challenge
to the "explanatory power" of Newton's theory a telling objection?  If not,
why not?  If so, should we cease regarding Newton's theory as the prototype
of science at its best?

Leibniz's claim is that Newton's "gravity" is a mysterious concept itself in
need of explanation.  Relying on gravity in explanation, when gravity itself
isn't explained, is no explanation at all.  Explanations which invoke
gravity might as well invoke demonic possession, ghosts, or some other
supernatural inexplicable force.

What would satisfy Leibniz as an explanation of gravity?  Presumably some
sort of causal underlying mechanism which would explain what gravity is.
Newton denies that any such thing is needed.  Newton's law of graviation
doesn't look to a cause for gravity; instead he says how gravity behaves.
For Newton, gravity, as a universal force, is a primitive.

Newton Principia suggests a new methodology in science, and it is this
methodology, as much as gravity, that Leibniz objects to.  Newton justifies
gravity on the grounds of abductive inference, its unifying power,
predictive success, etc.  This gives Newton's theory its explanatory power.
Newton does not believe he needs to identify a causal underlying mechanism
to have an explanation; Leibniz thinks he does.  We should not cease
regarding Newton's theory as good science; we just need to recognize it as a
different kind of science than was practiced prior to Newton.

Newton agrees with Leibniz that the cause of gravity is in some way
occult/unknown.  But Newton does not see this as a vicious problem, whereas
Leibniz does.  Newton is convinced that gravity exists, as it deduced from
phenomena and made general by the method of induction [see feign hypotheses
question], and so gravity itself is not occult and the theory of gravity has
explanatory power.

Cotes defends Newton against Leibniz's objection in the preface to the
second edition of the Principia by reducing the objection to absurdity.  He
says: Critics of Newton (meaning Leibniz) say gravity is occult and occult
causes should be banished from philosophy.  But though the cause of gravity
may be occult, gravity itself is not an occult cause of celestial motions
because it has been shown from phenomena that this force exists.  Should
gravity be banished from natural philosophy because the cause of gravity
itself has not been found?  No; reasoning in such a way leads to an infinite
regress, a causal chain where each cause would need to be explained by
another, lower-level, cause.  Eventually this reaches a simplest
lowest-level cause for which there is no further explanation, but this would
mean that none of the causes which depend upon this cause are really
explained.  So by extension of Leibniz's argument all so-called explanations
really just invoke the unexplained.  If gravity is to be cast out from
philosophy and physics on the grounds that it is miraculously inexplicable,
then pretty much everything else needs to be thrown out as well.

(Sources: Newton's General Scholium in the 2nd and 3rd editions of the
Principia, aslo the Scholium to Book 1, section 11, Cotes' preface to the
2nd edition; Cohen's commentary in the Principia and Introduction to
Newton's Principia; Smith's "How Did Newton Discover Universal Gravity? and
"The Methodology of the Principia", and assorted articles in the Cambridge
Companion)

*****
HISTORY
*****

"The principal task of the philosophy of science is the rational
reconstruction of the history of science." What are the implications of this
view for the relationship between philosophy of science and history of
science?  Is this what the relationship between the two disciplines ought to
be?

In brief, Lakatos looks to history which is good, but he rewrites it in an
ahistorical way which is bad.  Philosophy of science should look to history
to teach, learn, and evaluate.  Philosophers should try to see past science
as it would have been seen at the time.

Lakatos (of methodology of scientific research programmes fame) is on the
right track with an understanding that philosophy of science needs to
consider the history of science.  Earlier positivist rational
reconstructions don't seem to have looked to history.  Kuhn's SSR challenged
such rational reconstructions, claiming that philosophers must consider the
history of science.  Lakatos's reconstructions are neither positivist nor
Kuhnian.

Lakatos' reconstructions, while historical, do not seem to be good
histories.  The history of science according to/written by philosophers of
science is different from that written by historians of science.
Philosophers write bad histories because they judge histories in terms of
philosophical lessons.  Philosophers raid the archives for evidence that
supports their theses and may ignore that which does not. This is a kind of
philosophical narative which is in some ways historical, but is not strickly
speaking a history (so historians won't like this).

Rational reconstructions seem prone to inaccurate, biased, ahistorical
histories, with philosophers choosing relevant examples from or paths in
history and omitting other events as irrelevant, when they may in fact be
quite relevant.  Historian see Lakatos' reconstructions as deformed history.
Pearce Williams sees Lakatosian reconstructions as whig histories, with real
history relegated to the footnotes of the reconstructions.  [See Pearce
Williams, "Should philosophers be allowed to write history?" 1975] Bloor and
social constructivists think the distinction between internal/constructed
and actual histories in untenable, and that the philosopher's accounts of
history would be improved by paying more attention to actual history than
constructed history.

So what should the relationship between philosophy of science and history of
science be?  Philosophy of science should be descriptively accurate, should
agree with practices in history, and should be able to explain/make sense of
history.  Philosophers of science should look to history for philosophical
problems and ideas, a standard against which to test philosophical theories,
and for a place from which philosophers can learn and evaluate science from
a critical distance.

Duhem says: History is required for teaching physics, for reminding
physicists that theories can fail, for reminding physicists that success is
possible, and for giving the physicist ground on which to stand while
sounding judging hte aim and structure of scientific theory.

But philosophers of science should not rewrite/revise history/textbooks.
Philosophers should try to see past science/theories as they would have been
seen at the time, not ahistorically/anachronistically.

Notes, quotes, and paraphrases:

The phrase "rational reconstruction" pre-dates Lakatos, going to at least
Hempel's D-N model.

Lakatos, "History of science and its rational reconstructions" 1971:
We can only be wise after the event.  Scientific rationality is a matter of
post-hoc rational reconstruction.  Similarly, "crucial experiments" are
rational reconstructions.  Rational reconstruction is primary, external
history is secondary.

Duhem's Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, p268-270, abridged but still
long:

The historical method: "The legitimate, sure, and fruitful method of
preparing a student to receive a physical hypothesis is the historical
method.  To retrace the transformations through which the empirical matter
accrued ... to describe the long collaboration by means of which common
sense and deductive logic [adapted to each other]: that is the best way ...
[to present] a correct and clear view of the very complex and living
organization of this science....

History through the physicist's eyes: "[This history has to be
abbreviated; we] neglect all merely accidental facts, e.g., the name of an
author, date of discovery, and episode or anecdote, in order to dwell only
on historical facts appearing essential to the physicist's eyes ....

Distinguished from geometry: "In geometry ... instruction can be offered
in a completely logical manner ... [one need not] know the road by which [a
postulate] has penetrated into science.... It is not the same with physics.
There ... it is forbidden to be purely and completely logical in teaching."

Logical analysis: "To give the history of a physical principle is at the
same time to make a logical analysis of it."

History reminds physicists that theories can fail: "By retracing for him
the long series of errors and hesistations preceding the discovery of each
principle, it puts him on guard against false evidence ... and by exhuming
doctrines once triumphant from the oblivion in which they lie, it reminds
him that the most attractive systems are only provisional representations,
and not definitive explanations."

History gives physicists hope for success: "by unrolling before him the
continuous tradition ... the predictions that theory has formulated and
experiment realized ... it creates and fortifies in him that conviction that
physical theory is not merely an artificial system ... but that it is an
increasingly more natural classification and an increasingly clearer
reflection of realities...."

"History thus maintains him in that state of perfect equilibrium in which
he can soundly judge the aim and structure of physical theory."

History in Companion, p157-158, abridged but still long:

Philosophy in the first half of the century had little use for history,
perhaps in this it was mimicking scientists or just focussing on logic to
the exclusion of all else.  This reversed with Kuhn's Structure in 1962,
after which philosophers wishing to argue against Kuhn needed known of the
history of science.

Lakatos suggests a demarcation criteria: The testing of philosophical
theories of science requires empirical historical testing.  Each
characterization (Popperian, inductivist, etc) should be treated as a
historical research programme.  Each should write their own histories
(attempting to accommodate as many agreed successes as possible), and then
these should be evaluated/compared.

"History had something to learn from philosophy.  Lakatos
claimed that 'all historians of science who hold that the progress of
science is progress in objective knowledge, use, willy-nilly some rational
reconstruction'.  A 'rational reconstruction' is a historical narrative in
which events are explained by reference to some methodological pattern....
All historical writing had some theoretical bias..... A historian of science
who regards the history of science as largely a story of advancing knowledge
must be committed to some normative conception of the scientific. Her
theoretical bias must include some ... answer to the demarcation problem."

Lakatos makes it sound as if history and pilosophy of science are two
aspects of the same subject.  Are they one and the same?  Would a union be
well-advised?  Kuhn (in The Essential Tension, 1977) says no to both
questions.  He says that it is 'often difficult to believe that both [his
history and philosophy students] had been engaged with the same texts.' The
explanation for the difference is that they have different goals.
"Historians want to understand how this individual came to believe that
specific theory.  Philosophers tend to be interested in the merits of the
theory as such, so it is entirely natural for them to construct a rigorous,
decontextualized version of whatever they are asked to discuss."  As such,
histories view the philosophers' attempts at history-writing with scorn;
they are narratives "driven by a purpose other than that of finding the best
explanation for the events in question."

What is the role of history of science in philosophy?  It is a source for
philosophers do provide a descriptive account of science or at least one
which is consistent with history, a source of philosophical problems and
questions, a source of solutions to philosophical riddles, a standard
against which to test philosophical theories (as Lakatos suggested), a
source for the raw materials of philosophical narratives, and a critical
distance from which to address questions of change in theory and method.
 
Some thoughts about the role for history in philosophy of science, in light
of thinking about SSR and reading Kuhn's introduction:

SSR is itself an example of what philosophy gains from the history of
science.  Kuhn's account is historically motivated.

Alleged progress in science is overstated: Looking at theory change/choice
shows us that theory change is not objective progress.

Viewing theories in their historical context: Considering theories as mere
logical reconstructions paints an inaccurate picture of science.
Philosophers tend to leave out that which they consider logically
inconsequential, but this includes leaving out things which are
descriptively essential (eg, the story as to how/why a particular scientist
came to a particular theory at a particular time).

Incommensurability: If paradigm shifts are literally shifts in world view
(the way we see the world) and are followed by rewriting of
textbooks/history, then a philosopher who wishes to understand an
older/abandoned theory needs to look to history and the method of historians
in order to approach the theory as it would have been studied at the time,
rather than viewing it ahistorically from the present perspective.

Understanding the doing of science rather than just the results of science:
In order for philosophers (Kuhn himself, his critics, et al) to understand
scienetific theory and theory change, they need more than a snapshop of the
state of science or a logical/positivist reconstruction thereof.  They must
study the historical process of science.  A historical record of the
research activity itself (not merely the sequence of its results) is a
source of facts, ideas, problems, and solutions for philosophers.

Social factors: One thing we see looking at the history of science (which we
might otherwise overlook) is that personal and/or historical accidents seem
to play a role in theory choice (p 4).  Philosophers who don't look to
history misunderstand theory choice.  (A further evaluation of these
accidental elements need not lead to absolute subjectivity/relativism; an
account can be given of theory choice involving some subjectivity and shared
values as well as logic.)


(Sources: History and Lakatos in Companion; end of Duhem; Kuhn's
"Introduction a Role for History" in SSR)

*****