The following is intended to be a fairly comprehensive set of notes from
Michael Loux's _Metaphysics_ (2002).


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Chapter 1
*********

Universals overview:

realism --- where objects are similar or agree in attribute, there is some
one thing they share; objects instantiate, exhibit, or exemplify properties,
qualities, attributes; opposed to nominalism

universals --- these shared, repeatable properties, qualities and attributes
are universal; contrasted with particulars; properties are one-place
universals; relations are many-place; kinds are things particulars belong to
rather than possess

ontology --- realists admit universals (not just particulars) in their
ontology because (among other reasons) they are used to explain
subject-predicate discourse and abstract reference


Predication and abstract reference:

predication --- a satisfactory analysis of "Socrates is courageous" must
explain the referential force of "courageous" (as in "Socrates exemplifies
the universal courage"); predicates refer to universals

abstract reference --- realists also claim that universals give us the
resources for explaining abstract singular terms (e.g., triangularity,
wisdom, mankind, courage) and sentences like "the tomato and the fire engine
have the same color"


Restrictions:

which universals --- not all predicates correspond with universals

exemplification paradoxes --- the predicate "does not exemplify itself"
leads to self-referential problems; regress when analyzing the predicate
"exemplifies"; only some find these problematic

defined predicates --- universals may be restricted to only undefined
predicates, where defined predicates are things like conjunctions and
negations (e,g., bachelor, unmarried); holists about universals think that
any such restriction will leave us without some of the universals we need
(Wittgenstein's game example)

uninstantiated properties --- Aristotelian realists believe there are no
universals corresponding to uninstantiated properties (universals in
things); Platonic realists believe there are universals corresponding to
uninstantiated properties (universals before things); nominalists think
universals are just words (universals after things)

Platonic/Aristotelian --- critics of Platonic realism say properties, kinds,
relations need to be anchored in the spatiotemporal world; Platonists argue
that if instantiated properties need be universals by similar argument so do
uninstantiated ones (all properties are necessarily properties, not just
instantiated ones)


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Chapter 2
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Nominalism overview:

nominalists --- deny that there are universals, generally because of a
belief that metaphysics should be a simple theory

austere nominalism --- there are only concrete particulars; claims which
seem to be about universals are really just about particulars

metalinguistic nominalism --- claims apparently about universals are ways of
talking about linguistic expressions

trope theory --- there are properties/qualities, but these are particulars
(not multiply instantiated)

motivation for nominalism includes --- not wanting to except "paradoxes" of
multiple instantiation (e.g., "the color red is 5 miles from itself"); no
noncircular account of universals possible; constructing simplest theory


Austere nominalism:

universals not needed --- austere nominalist claims an ontology of concrete
particulars alone provides resources for dealing with all of the phenomena
which one might otherwise use universals to explain

no problem with predication --- need not appeal to universals to explain
predication; what makes a subject-predicate sentence of the form 'a is F'
true is just that a is F', not that there is some universal F

translate talk which seems to be about universals --- 'red is a color' can
be translated to 'red objects are colored objects'; 'tomatoes and fire
engines are the same color' as 'they agree colorwise'

difficulties with austere nominalism --- many things must be taken as
unanalyzable primitives; account of sentences is not general; simpler theory
is more unwileldly


Metalinguistic nominalism:

metalinguistic --- sentences incorporating abstract referring devices aren't
really about objects; they are about linguistic expressions used to talk
about objects; talk about universals is just talk about the elements of
language

Carnap -- talk about triangularity is really talk about the general term
'triangular'; to say 'is a property' or 'is a relation' is really just to
say the term is an adjective or the term is a many-place predicate

difficulties with Carnap --- distinction of type/token; sounds like
translation from one language to another will be a problem (although
Sellars introduces a dot notation to avoid this)


Trope theory:

trope theorists --- in addition to concrete particulars there are (singly
exemplifiable) attributes; there are colors, shapes, etc and these are
particulars; the red color of a particular ball is unique to it alone

D.C. Williams --- the sense in which two lollipops have the same shape is
not the same as the sense in which two brothers have the same father

why add tropes --- immediate objects of perceptual awareness are colors,
smells, sounds, shapes, etc

names --- abstract single terms are names

difficulty with trope theory --- the set of tropes that "being a unicorn" is
associated with is the same as the set of tropes that "being a griffin" is
associated with; sets have their members necessarily


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Chapter 3
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Particulars overview:

two common accounts of particulars --- substratum theory and bundle theory

substratum theory --- concrete particular is whole of various properties and
an underlying subject/substratum that has an identity independent of the
properties (bare particular)

bundle theory --- concrete particular is a bundle of properties with no
substratum

Aristotelian substance theory --- some familiar concrete particulars are
taken as ontologically fundamental entities; this is a compromise as there
is not a bare particular, but there is something besides just properties


For and against bundle theory:

for --- bare particulars of substratum unacceptable to empiricists because
they can't be seen; bare particulars also paradoxical as they both have and
don't have attributes at the same time

some objections --- bundle theory unattractive to those who say it cannot
explain what holds properties of a particular together or subject-predicate
claims and that it leads to the identity of indiscernibles (impossible for
two different particulars to have the same properties)

predication --- substrata are needed to explain predication; according to
substratum theory, a small red ball must be something which has the
properties small, red, and ball; this bare thing itself is not itself small,
red, ball; it is under or supports these attributes

identity through change --- bundle theory cannot accommodate intuition that
familiar object remains identical through change; if object just is
properties, it doesn't seem it is the same object after these properties
have changed

identity of indiscernibles --- bundle theory seems to not allow for distinct
multiply exemplifiable entities


For and against substratum theory:

for --- substrata provide a way to differentiate between objects which are
numerically different but agree in all pure properties (two identical
objects); substrata provide a way to explain predication (although perhaps
there are problems here)

against --- substrata actually don't explain predication; they introduce the
paradox of both having and not having attributes at the same time; the idea
of having a bare entity seems deeply flawed


Aristotelian substance:

third option --- need not accept bundle or substratum; instead take (some)
concrete particulars as basic/fundamental entities; concrete particulars
cannot be built out of colors, shapes, etc; both substratum and bundle get
the constituent-whole relation wrong

compared with bundle theory --- Aristotelians agree that the being of a
concrete particular is grounded in the attributes associated with it; but
disagree by not taking all attributes as equally part of an object's being
and by considering kinds as well as properties

compared with substratum theory --- agree that attributes of a particular
require a substratum; but disagree by not thinking this is bare

essences --- Aristotelians as taking some properties to be essential
(necessary) to an object's being; bundle theorists as ultraessentialists;
substratum theorists as antiessentialists; Leibniz as individual essences

kind --- like a set but prior to its members, a class, a noun; kinds
identify the core being or essence of (natural) particulars; unlike
properties, kinds instantiate numerically different particulars

ousia --- natural/living concrete particulars are basic/unanalyzable
substances (ousia)

reduction presents difficulty --- if the threat of reduction is genuine,
Aristotelian can't treat substances (i.e., living things) as primitive and
must explain their parts (macroscopic and/or microscopic)


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Chapter 4
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Propositions overview:

propositions --- language/mind-independent abstract entities that realists
admit to their ontologies to function as the objects of acts of
assertion/denial and acts of thinking; propositions are referents of
that-clauses and primary bearers of truth values

against propositions --- work of propositions can be done by reference to
sentences; Prior's redundancy theory of truth (talk apparently about
propositions is really about concrete objects); Russell's multiple relation
theory; Putnam and others from phil mind/language try to undermine realism
about propositions

beyond propositions --- other entities include facts (things in the world
corresponding to what makes a proposition true), states of affairs
(situations that have essentially the property of obtaining or failing to
obtain), and events (things that happen)


Realism about propositions:

explanatory role --- when a speaker says "Socrates is courageous" the
speaker is making an assertion, or asserting some thing (namely a
proposition); adding such things to an ontology plays an explanatory role

bearers of truth --- to say a sentence is true/false is to mean that the
proposition it expresses is true/false

substitution --- substitution in that-clauses (nominalizations) is not
truth-preserving, as in "Clark is Superman", "Lois believes that Superman
can fly", but not "Lois believes that Clark can fly"

disagreements --- realists about propositions have internal disagreements;
some hold that propositions have truth values eternally, others that they
vary over time; some believe propositions serve as the meanings of
declarative sentences (so two statements can have the same reference but
different meanings), while others don't


Nominalism about propositions:

against realism --- nominalists charge the usual arguments of bloated
ontologies, mysterious abstract entities, Ockham's razors; instead
nominalists argue that claims about propositions are really disguised ways
of making metalinguistic claims, claims about the objects themselves, or
claims about beliefs

metalinguistic nominalism --- claims that appear to be about propositions
are actually just about sentences (properly indexed and with Sellars' dot
quotation to cut across different languages)

concrete objects --- according to Prior talk about propositions is about
familiar concrete objects; talk about the proposition that the moon is made
of green cheese is simply talk about the moon; Prior uses Ramsey's
redundancy theory of truth (the concept of truth is redundant as to assert
that p is true is simply to assert that p)

difficulties with Prior's account --- Prior's notion of "believes that"
seems to work when there is a fully specified that-clause, but not in cases
like "Sam believes everything Peter says"; to this Prior replies by
introducing variables and quantification ("For all p, Peter says p => Sam
believes that p"); still Prior has an easy way to deal with "There are
truths for which there is no linguistic expression and there are falsehoods
for which there is no linguistic expression"

Russell's nominalism --- mental acts are the primary bearers of truth
values; Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio should not be analyzed
as a relationship between Othello and the abstract entity picked out by
"that D loves C", but rather that belief here is a four place relation
operating on Othello, loving, D, and C


Facts, states of affairs, events:

facts --- facts are those things in the world that make propositions true;
they are the things that are the case

states of affairs --- situations that obtain or fail to attain (e.g.,
Clinton's being a slow runner, nine being prime); some claim there is a 1-1
correspondence between propositions and states of affairs; for a proposition
to be true is for the world to be such that the state of affairs it
determines obtains

Chisholm's events --- Chisholm takes states of affairs as primitive; states
of affairs which obtain (or fail to obtain) all the time as propositions;
states of affairs which only sometimes obtain are events (things which can
recur); events are particulars, namely a state of affairs at a given time;
events are repeatable general states individuated by the content they
present to cognitive beings

Kim's events --- an event is a particular contingent thing's exemplifying a
property at a time; events have structure (thing, property, time)

Davidson's events --- events are particulars that can be described in all
sorts of ways; events provide accounts of adverbs and function as terms of
the causal relation; events are structureless particulars that get
individuated by their causal histories


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Chapter 5
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Modality overview:

possible worlds --- the idea of a plurality of possible worlds as the tool
for clarifying modality

de dicto and de re --- de dicto is modality (necessity/possibility) of a
proposition (e.g., "Necessarily there are nine planets"); de re is about
objects (e.g., "Two plus seven is necessarily nine")

appeal of possible worlds --- possible worlds (with set theory) may provide
the tools for a reductive nominalism with an ontology of just particulars
and sets (Lewis); possible worlds can be taken as one of many interrelated
concepts that can be used to clarify each other (Plantinga)

extensionality --- modality presents a problem to standard logics because
paradoxes arise from different truth values when substituting propositions


Possible worlds:

semantics --- a proposition p is necessary just in case p is true in all
possible worlds W; an object j is necessarily k just in case the proposition
'j is k' is true in all possible worlds W where j exists

propositions --- a proposition p is understood as the set of possible worlds
where the proposition p is true


Lewis/nominalism:

other worlds --- just more things of the same kind as the actual world; a
complete or total way things might have been; all the objects in these
worlds are fully real; the actual world is just the possible world which is
"here"

world-bound individuals --- according to Lewis there are no transworld
individuals; the same object cannot be in multiple worlds, as this goes
against the indiscernibility of identicals (e.g., "X in w1 is pale while X in
w2 is tan"; this can be resolved by saying "X is pale-in-w1", but this
leaves pale simpliciter undefined)

counterparts --- if individuals are world-bound, there needs to be a way to
make sense of intuition that when we say "I could have done otherwise" we
mean the same "I" in another world; Lewis's solution is a counterpart
relation of similarity/resemblance; counterpart is the "you of another
world"

difficulties with Lewis --- counterpart may not actually satisfy intuition
of sameness; all worlds/objects fully real seems mysterious; propositions as
sets seems hard to believe; theory may not have explanatory power it claims
to have


Plantinga/actualism:

actualism --- the only things that exist are the entities of the actual
world (Plantinga); contrast with possibilism (Lewis) that there exist
possible, nonactual objects

non-reduction --- possible worlds not serve to reduce the modal to the
nonmodal, but that the possible world is part of the network of the useful
framework of modal concepts

states of affairs --- all possible worlds are states of affairs and exist,
but only one world (the actual) obtains (and contains objects which exist);
for Plantinga embracing possible worlds does not commit us to the existence
of things in other worlds (though Lewis' account does)

abstract --- Plantinga's possible worlds are abstract entities, while Lewis'
are concrete particulars

transworld identity --- objects (the same objects) can exist (and have
objects) in multiple worlds (needed to make an essence-accident distinction,
as otherwise every object would have all of its properties essentially);
avoids problem with indisc of ident by having world-indexed properties,
where the property simpliciter is understood as the property in the actual
world

difficulties with Plantinga --- still seems odd to say that the same
individual is in multiple worlds; idea of individual essences (Leibniz) is
hard to accept


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Chapter 6
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Persistence overview:

endurantism/perdurantism --- according to endurantism for a concrete
particular to persist through time is for it to exist wholly at different
times (3D); for pedurantism a concrete particular is a whole made up of
different temporal parts/phases/stages/slices and is larger than the part of
that particular which exists at a given moment (4D)

presentism/eternalism --- according to presentism, only what exists now is
real; according to eternalism, all times and their contents are equally
real; often presentism parallels endurantism while eternalism parallels
perdurantism

parallel actualism/possibilism --- recall that actualism recognized only the
actual world as real (like presentism), while possibilism took all worlds
and contents to be equally real (like eternalism); similarly, both
possibilism and perdurantism exclude transworld/time individuals; the full
parallel here is 3D/endurantism/presentism/actualism vs
4D/perdurantism/eternalism/possibilism

scattered objects --- for perdurantists there is a material object for every
filled region of spacetime (even one as strange as the mereological sum of
Joe before 1980 and Ed's earlobe after 1980); there are infinitely many ways
of cutting up the 4D material world into material objects; familiar objects
are those with relations of spatiotemporal proximity, similarity, causation;
endurantists deny such scattered objects entirely


Change in properties:

argument for perdurantism --- endurantist account does not explain
persistence through change, as they tree in the fall would not be the same
as the tree in the spring because they are qualitatively discernible;
perdurantists believe their account preserves indisc of ident and our
beliefs about persistence through change; the "two" trees are the same
because the are both temporal slices of the whole tree

parallels possibilism/actualism --- recall according to possibilism we had
world-indexed objects while in actualism we had world-indexed properties;
here for perdurantism we have time-indexed objects while for endurantism we
have time-indexed properties; similar arguments about properties simpliciter
are raised by the perdurantist against endurantism


Change in parts:

argument for perdurantism --- endurantist account does not explain
persistence through change in parts

Descartes-Minus --- suppose Descartes loses a hand at time t, there's
Descartes-before-t = Descartes-after-t, but there's also
Descartes-minus-before-t = Descartes-after-t, so Descartes-minus-before-t =
Descartes-before-t (Heller, Van Inwagen)

sameness --- Chisholm (following Butler) says there are two senses of the
word "same", the "strict and philosophical" sense and the "loose and
popular" sense; Geach says there are multiple identity relations, namely
"the same F"


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Chapter 7
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Anti-Realism overview:

Realism (traditional) --- there is a mind-independent world about which we
form beliefs and make statements which are true just in case they correspond
to the world they are about (thought/language independent of the world)

anti-Realism --- reality is construed in part by our conceptual activities;
semantic arguments for anti-Realism include Dummett's (semantics underlying
Realism fail to account for meaning of undecidable statements), Quine's
(inscrutability of reference)

anti-Realists --- many different kinds of anti-Realists; phenomenalists
(Berkeley, external world only exists in mind of perceivers); Kant (things
as they appear to us are constituted in part by our ways of experiencing
them); pragmastists (truth is analyzed in terms of evidence and other
epistemological concepts); language (Dummett & Putnam, Realism rests on
untenable semantic grounds, for Dummett this is shown with unknowable
statements, for Putnam with all statements)


Dummett:
 
truth --- Dummett rejects the truth-conditional theory (for a statement to
be true is for the state of affairs that is its truth condition to obtain)
in favor of an epistemic theory of meaning (meaning understood in terms of
evidence, justification, etc); for Dummett truth is warranted assertability;
a statement is true if it is justifiable, so the world/truth depends upon
the mind/evidence

unknowable statements --- Dummett believes unknowable statements are a
problem for Realists who maintain that to understand a statement is to know
the state of affairs which is its truth condition because we can understand
what unknowable statements are saying without knowing their truth conditions
(manifestation and acquisition arguments)


Quine and Putnam:

indeterminacy of radical translation --- cannot determine translations
between different languages (gavagai)

inscrutability of reference --- indeterminacy holds even within a language

reference-fixing --- must fix references to a language/theory to avoid
inscrutability of reference

Putnam on Quine --- inscrutability of reference shows Realism's two sets of
corresponding objects (linguistic items and mind-independent items) is
incoherent; for any statement there is not a one-to-one correlation to the
objects the statement, rather a statement about "cat" could be about cats,
cat-hood, or even fish; reference must always be relative to some background
structure so the idea of mind-independent objects is incoherent