The following are some notes from Kim and Sosa's Companion to Metaphysics. I've tried to group them into categories. ****** Properties and universals: universals --- if they exist, universals correspond to some monadic properties (is red) multiple-place relations (is north of), and kinds (is a cat); particulars instantiate, participate in, resemble, or belong to universals realism --- universals exist; Platonic realism include uninstantiated universals (universals before things); Aristotelian doesn't include uninstantiated universals because universals are in things nominalism --- no universals, properties are just names; the only real universality expressed by nominalized predicates resides in their status as names capable of referring to many particulars; suspicious of multiply-instantiable universals or abstract entities in general (empiricists); Goodman kinds of nominalism --- predicate nominalism (different things have the same property if the same predicate is true of them), concept nominalism (substitutes concepts in the mind for words in the mouth), class (to be white is to be a member of the class of white things), mereological (a property is the aggregate of all things with that property so whiteness is a huge white object), resemblance (network of resemblance relations) trope theory --- properties are not multiply-instantiable universals but abstract particulars change --- an object undergoes change if it has a property at time t which it does not have at time t+1 concreta/abstracta --- abstracta include properties, relations, propositions, sets, numbers); concreta include material substances, events, times, places, and tropes extrinsic property --- not intrinsic; to possess F is to stand in some relation to other contingent things; "being north of", "having met Joe"; only changes in intrinsic properties imply real change (see change, concrete/abstract, extrinsic/intrinsic, nominalism, realism, tropes, universals) ****** Particulars: theories of particulars --- for bundle theory, individual things are no more than bundles of co-instantiated properties (no substrata); for substratum theory, the substrata are bare particulars which are the particulars themselves which hold properties together, also individuators; for substance theory, there is a non-bare substance consisting of essential properties for/against bare particulars--- bare particulars provide an explanation of change and identity of indiscernibles; bare particulars are unobservable (Locke's "something I know not what"), are unnecessary, and lead to many paradoxes including "bare particulars have the property of having no properties" bundle theory --- Berkeley, Russell, Goodman; pro is not having to explain bare particulars; con is having to explain identity of indiscernibles; change is explained in terms of sequences of sets of properties over time substance theory --- substance is a primary reality which can exist alone without the need for anything outside; Aristotle's ousia; individuators without bare particulars, haecceity (thisness, essence), survivors of change, objects of reference temporal parts --- objects are four dimensional objects consisting of three dimensional temporal parts vagueness --- underspecified, borderline cases; vagueness is worlds alone vs vagueness in objects/reality sorities argument (grains of sand make heap) (see bare particulars, bundle theory, substance, temporal parts, vagueness) ****** Existence and identity: Quine --- to be is to be the value of a bound variable non-existent objects --- for Meinong and Parsons there are non-existent objects; "Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist" says of Holmes that he doesn't exist; Russell uses definite descriptions and quantifier logic; Evans make-believedly true; Mally extranuclear properties; Zalta exemplifying/encoding numerical identity --- a thing x is numerically identical with a thing y if x and y are one and the same qualitative identity --- a thing x is numerically identical with a thing y if x and y share all of their properties, also referred to as strict identity temporary identity --- two things which during a period of time are made of of the same matter (piece of rubber and rubber ball) sortal relativity (Geach) --- there is only relative identity; we cannot simply ask whether a thing x and a thing y are one and the same but must ask whether they are the same F sortal dependency (Wiggins) --- what Geach describes is not identity but similarity; a sortal is a term which tells us what a thing is necessary identity (Kripke) --- if a thing x is identical with a thing y then it is necessarily the case that x is identical with y (argument follows from Leibniz's Law coincidence --- sometimes called contingent identity, the relation which holds between a piece of rubber and a rubber ball made of it provided they come into and out of being at the same time material composition (Butler, Chisholm) --- when a tree alters its material composition it retains its identity in a "loose and popular" not "strict and philosophical" sense identity of indiscernibles --- also called Leibniz's Law; if x and y are property-wise indiscernible then they are identical; there is no such thing as two individuals which are indiscernible from each other; if individual x is distinct from individual y then there is some intrinsic, non-relational property F that x has and y lacks (see existence, fictional truth, identity, non-existent objects, Quine) ****** Possibility: possible world semantics --- possible worlds represent a complete way things might have been (Leibniz, Kripke); propositions are sets of possible worlds or functions from worlds to truth values necessity, possibility, contingency --- necessity is truth in all possible worlds; possibility is truth in some possible world; contingency is true in the actual world but not in all other words (could have been otherwise) possibilism (Lewis) --- there really are a plurality of worlds which are all things of the same kind as the actual world (the world which happens to be here); possible worlds have inhabitants (which can be different from the ones here); counterparts rather than transworld individuals because the same individual can't exist in multiple places actualism (Plantinga) --- possible worlds are just states of affairs; only the real world is actual; there are transworld individuals which goes with intuition that counterfactual situations involve real individuals; merely possible individuals are not things that don't exist, instead they are uninstantiated conceptions; there are transworld individuals which takes de dicto/de re --- de dicto modality is about propositions (Possibly the number of planets is greater than nine); de re modality is about objects (Nine is necessarily greater than seven essential/accidental --- essential properties (essence) are those properties a thing must have so long as it exists; accidental properties are those properties a thing could exist without; an object has a property essentially if it has it in such a way that it is not even possible that it exist but fail to have it (de re) essentialism --- Aristotle (some of an objects properties are essential); Leibniz (everything has all of its properties essentially, pan-essentialism, individual entities; similar to haecceities, individual essences); anti-essentialism (Putnam, Quine, essential properties lead to problems with Leibniz' Law) (see essence/accident, essence and essentialism, modalities, possible worlds) ****** Truth: facts, events, states of affairs --- facts are complex entities of particulars in an arrangement; events are anything which happens or occurs; states of affairs are possibilities proposition --- something capable of being the meaning of a declarative sentence; primary bearer of truth and modal properties; object of knowledge, belief etc reference --- according to Frege names are synonymous with definite descriptions (description theory); for Russell descriptions can be analyzed away so ordinary names don't refer but simple predicates do; according to Wittgenstein and Searles what a person means by a name is specified by a collection of descriptions (cluster theory); for Kripke references are baptisms (let that be called N); for deflationary/minimal theory the meaning of 'refers' is implicitly captured by 'name "N" refers to a thing iff that this is identical to N' bearers of truth --- to what kind of entities should truth predicates be applied? specific utterances (the words used), mental states (believing that), linguistic acts (assertions), propositions (what is asserted)? correspondence theory --- Austin, Wittgenstein; the truth of a proposition is due to features of the external world; a proposition is true just in case there exists a fact corresponding to it; that is, the proposition that p is true iff p; we still need to explain what it is for a proposition to correspond to a fact; also this approach doesn't seem very enlightening as reducing 'the proposition that snow is white is true' to 'the fact that snow is white exists' doesn't seem very different verificationist theory --- Bradley, Dummett, Peirce; associated with each proposition there is a specific procedure for finding out whether one should believe it or not; for example, in math this is provability; this approach is much clearer than the correspondence theory; still it is hard to explain the tie between verification and truth itself coherence theory --- Bradley, Hempel; holistic verification theory; a belief is true when it is verified/justified; a belief is justified when it is part of an entire system of beliefs that is consistent and harmonious pragmatism --- James, Papineau; true beliefs are a good basis for action so true assumptions are by definition those that provoke action with desirable results; again this is explanatory, but it's hard to see what truth has do with desirable action deflationary (redundancy?) theory --- Quine, Ramsey, Strawson; there is no need for any further specification about truth than 'the proposition that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white'; deflationary theory can adequately explain truth for all needed purposes; problems include that there are an infinite number of axioms and that the equivalence schema falls prey to the liar paradox semantic antirealism --- Dummett et al; we do not have to regard every declarative statement of our language as determinately true or false independently of our means of coming to know what its truth value is (rejection of principle of bivalence) antirealist beliefs --- meaning is given by truth conditions, meaning is determinate, truth is not bivalent, antirealism stresses observable behavior as the source of meaning, naturalistic metaphysical outlook weaknesses of antirealism --- goes against intuition that the world is independent of human cognitive faculties, failure to appreciate the strength of arguments to the effect that translation is indeterminate Quine --- truth is disquotational; to say 'that snow is white' is to assert that snow is white (see antirealism, fact, proposition, reference, Quine, theories of truth) ****** Causation: causation --- making something happen; may or may not be lawlike Hume --- billiard balls; an object followed by another where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second; if the first had not been, the second would never have existed; causes are contiguous and precedent in time, etc; constant conjunction implies to the mind a necessary connection, but there is no real connection only causal inferences based on custom/habit Davidson --- cause and effect are events Mackie --- supports backward causation and inus conditions of counterfactuals (insufficient but nonredundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition) action theory --- the concept of action applies only to beings with wills determinism --- the state of the world at one time determines the state of the world at any future time; taken by incompatibilists/determinists to mean we have no free will free will --- moral responsibility and autonomy or self-determination libertarians --- human beings are free in a way that precludes determinism compatibilists --- determinism and free will are compatible (see action theory, causation, determinism, event theory, free will, Hume)