Metaphysics Study Questions January 2003
Answers in a Nutshell (or Am I Nuts?)
(More notes follow after all short answers)
(1) What is it for a truth to be a necessary truth?
obtaining (is true) in all possible worlds, could not have been other than
true.
(2) What is the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals? What is
the principle of substitutivity? What is the relationship between these two
principles? Are either or both of these true? Why should either of these
principles be of central concern to metaphysics?
Forall P, Px=Py implies x=y. x=y implies we can substitute y for x. Both
are false. The first takes = to be qualitative identity. The second takes =
to be having the same meaning. Russell's descriptions, statements of belief
(CK=Superman; Hesper=Phosphor), tautology and meaning, speaker's attitude
(Linsky), falsehoods (LBJ elected every 4 years). Central because concern
identity.
(3) In his paper "Four-Dimensionalism", van Inwagen offerers the following
(almost embarrassingly simple) argument against the doctrine of temporal
parts:
"If [four-dimensionalism] is correct, then Descartes is composed of
temporal parts, and all temporal parts are modally inductile. But
Descartes himself is one of his temporal parts -- the largest one, the sum
of all of them. But the (sic?) Descartes himself is modally inductile,
which means he could not have had a temporal extent greater than 54 years.
But this is obviously false, and [four-dimensionalism] is therefore
wrong.".
Is this a good argument? Is there a good argument for temporal parts?
Bad argument. Either temporal parts aren't modally inductile (could have
been longer) or Descartes himself isn't a temporal parts (parts are only
proper subsets). 4D is good because it gives us a way to talk about
persistence (perdurance) through change (Heller).
(4) Actualism is the view that only actual objects exist. Presentism is the
view that only the present time and its contents exist. Can an actualist
allow that we refer to merely possible objects? Can a presentist allow that
we refer to objects in the past?
Actualism (modal) can not refer to possible objects but possibility of
existence by saying "would exist if the other state of afairs were actual";
similarly a presentist (temporal) can express that an object existed by
saying "it was true at past time true to say 'object exists'." It's all
semantics. Actualism account harder; might use QML with different domains,
some sort of counterpart, individual essences and coexemplification, world
stories, non-concrete existence.
(5) Are properties universals or particulars? Are they concrete or
abstract? Do they exist at all? Justify your answers.
Arbitrary decision: abstract universals (as opposed to say tropes). If I
had justification, I'd tell you.
(6) Many metaphysics problems (free will, endurance vs perdurance,
nominalism vs realism) seem insoluble. Some have suggested that their
insolubility is a result of one or another sort of relativity. State and
evaluate some representive (sic) versions of this idea.
Skipping this one.
(7) Is there anything wrong with the following principle?
For every material object M, if R is the region of space occupied by M at
time t, and if sub-R is an occupiable sub-region of R whatever, there
exists a material object that occupies the region sub-R at t.
There's nothing wrong with it that I can see (unless it's a problem to have
infinitely many objects). Something wrong with it when combined with
identity is expressed by Tibbles and Tibbles-minus (Wiggins, Rea, Locke).
(8) State Quine's criterion for ontological commitment. What reasons have
philosophers given for accepting it? What reasons have philosophers given
for denying it? Explain.
"To be is to be the value of a (bound) variable." One reason for believing
this is that Quine says so and Quine is (approximately) God.
(9) It has sometimes been said that all there is to say about the truth is
what is said by sentences of the form: A is true iff p, where A is a name of
the sentence p. Compare a view of truth according to which this is so with
a view of truth that denies it. Evaluate.
Invoking the fifth amendment.
(10) What is the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic properties and
internal and external relations?
Lewis and Yablo talk about extrinsic and intrinsic properties; intrinsic are
those an object has itself, extrinsict depend on something outside of the
objects. Relations may or may not be just multiplace properties. Internal
relations seem to have to do with a particular object itself (part/whole,
relation between several of its intrinsic? properties); external relations
relate it to another object.
(11) Is there a "necessary connection" between causes and effects? Explain.
Not a general causal connexion (Hume's spelling). There's an observed
constant conjunction, and the connection is in our minds not the outside
world.
(12) Is there any sense in which free action and determinism are
incompatible? Is there any sense in which they are compatible? Justify
your answers.
Free action and determinism might seem incompatible because determinism
means the state of affairs at time t determines the state of affairs at time
t+1. But this doesn't mean that that the events are determined by something
external and so actions are unavoidable/inevitable. We are part of the
determining process (agent determinism). So there is compatibility; what we
want is liberty (Locke, Hume) to decide to act in a certain way and then
freedom from constraint to act in accord with liberty. Can even take a
strong compatibilist position and say that free will/moral responsibility
requires determinism because otherwise action is just randomness.
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Notes:
Metaphysics Study Questions January 2003
(1) What is it for a truth to be a necessary truth?
I'm not sure where to go with this question.
The key words seem to be "necessary" and "truth". Necessity and contingency
(non-necessary truth) seem to me to be best explained in (Krypke's) possible
world semantics / modal logic. For a truth to be necessarily true, it must
be impossible for it not to be true. That is, no matter what else changes
the truth remains true. It is true that I am studying for a philosophy
exam. But is it necessarily true that I am studying for a philosophy exam?
It doesn't seem so. I can imagine possibilities (some rather more
interesting ones) in which I am not studying. So to say that my studying is
a truth but a non-necessary (contingent) truth is to say that it (the truth,
proposition, state of affairs, whatever) could have been otherwise (false).
And to say that something is a necessary truth is to say it could not have
been otherwise.
So let's say it is a necessary truth that I am studying. That is, there is
no possible way the world could be in which the proposition "I am studying"
is false (does not obtain). Or, as some might say, the set of worlds in
which "I am studying" is true is equal to the set of all possible worlds.
Kind of scary; I'd really like to think I could not be studying. What other
things might I be doing instead? Realistically, reading mail logs or
sleeping. Less realistically (or rather less like the actual world),
throwing snowballs at the neighbors, playing Beethoven's Fifth on a ukulele,
running a 2-minute mile, performing angle trisection using only a straight
edge and compass. These examples point out different kinds of necessity.
It is a logically necessary truth that I'm not trisecting an angle (it can't
be done) and a physically necessary truth that I'm not running a 2-minute
mile (I just physically can't do that no matter how I try). Could I be
playing Beethoven on a ukelele? Not unless things were pretty darned
different than they are. Could I be throwing a snowballs? Probably,
although I'd want to put on a lot more clothing first. This is getting
pretty silly ....
And why "a truth to be a necessary truth" rather than "a proposition to be a
necessary truth"? Truth sounds to me like logic. Logically, tautologies
are necessary truths. A = A is a necessary truth. Within a logical system,
all deductions are necessary truths: Given p => q and given p, that q is
true follows necessarily; that is, (p=>q and p) => q.
What does the phrase "a necessary truth" mean anwyay? Is this different
from asking "What is it for a truth to be necessarily true?"
I think not. In which case I should probably just talk about possible
worlds (necessary truth is truth in possible worlds where the expression is
defined) and whether there are any necessary truths. If there are, what
would they be? Mathematical truths? Physical truths? Logical truths?
*****
(2) What is the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals? What is
the principle of substitutivity? What is the relationship between these two
principles? Are either or both of these true? Why should either of these
principles be of central concern to metaphysics?
(See http://structuredindividuals.com/paradox/toc.html,
http://structuredindividuals.com/let/l12.html)
I think I could be relatively well-prepared to answer this question. The
principle of identity of indiscernibles (not what the question asks about) says benignly that for all
properties P, if P(x)=P(y) then x=y. A bit more controversially, it says
that if x and y are indiscernible (have all their properties in common) they
are identical. (Somehow things get more controversial when we move from '='
to 'identical'.) The indiscernibility of identicals (also known as
Leibniz' Law) says the converse, that if x=y then for all P P(x)=P(y). In
other words, that identicals are indiscernible.
Leibniz's law as people take it (principle of substitutivity): If a is
identical to b then b can alway be substituted for a and vice versa.
Leibniz's law as stated: Eadem sunt, quorum unum potest substitui alteri
salva veritate. (Those things are the same of which one can be
substituted for the other without loss of truth.)
Seems to me the first is a bit of a leap from the second since it seems
like a and be are objects and "is identical" means "is the same object",
not a and b are names and the concern is with propositions which preserve
truth-functional equivalence.
Note: It seems to me that a number of problems arise from "identical iff
indiscernible" because it's unclear what is meant by identical. I think the
point isn't really that identical is equivalent with indiscernible but that
qualitative (or property or type, if you prefer) identity is
indiscernibility. However, by identity we often mean something different
from indiscernibility.
What is meant by identity/identical is ambiguous. Just look at all the
different ways we have to compare two things (comparison operators). Assign
to A some value (or let A be a name which refers to some object) and assign
to B some value. Are A and B two different names for the same object? That
is, are A and B numerically identical? Do they name two different instances
of the same thing? Do they name two things which are of the same type but
are different tokens (A="foo"; B="foo")? I think for identity we probably
need both qualitiative and numeric identity.
Can two things be indiscernible but numerically distinct? That is, can
there be two things which share all of the same properties, like the two
spheres in Black's example? It seems so as long as we don't consider
spacial location. I have two penguins that look exactly the same. I might
very well say they are indiscernible (as I might also say of two copies of
the same book), but certainly they are numerically distinct. I have two
penguins. But then it seems that there must be someway I can distinguish
between them, although paradoxically it also seems accurate to call them
identical.
Can two names refer to the same object but be discernible? It seems so.
The same object can be considered in two different ways. Consider a clay
statue called X. X-qua-clay has different properties than X-qua-statue.
Namely, X-qua-clay might have been come into existence at a different time
than X-qua-statue, and that X-qua-clay could have had a different form
whereas X-qua-statue couldn't have. They are materially identical, but
clearly something different is being pointed out by X-qua-clay than by
X-qua-statue.
And now finally I'm getting back to the question. The principle of
substitutivity says (I think) that if a=b than b can be substituted wherever
there is an occurrence of a. And I think that if by '=' we mean numerically
identical this is false. X-qua-clay is numerically identical with
X-qua-statue but while it is true to say that X-qua-clay could have been a
different statue, it is not true to say that X-qua-statue could have been a
different statue. Here's another example (not original, but I can't
remember whose, something in the anthology): (1) Superman = Clark Kent and
(2) Lois believes Superman is courageous. (3) Therefore, Lois believes that
Clark is courageous. Well this is just false, because Lois doesn't know
that Superman = Clark. Some have argued that substitutivity can't be
applied to belief statements.
But I'm not sure when it can be applied (see Russell? and others in chapter
1 of the anthology and the last batch of jstor articles). One (dated)
example (Linsky) was "suppose I am the president's assistant and a close
personal friend. I get a call from someone asking to speak with 'Mr
President'. I call up the president and speak to his wife and relay the
message: 'So-and-so asked to speak with Lyndon.' Well, that's not what was
asked." Simiarly "Joe wondered if the author of Through the LookingGlass
(Lewis Carroll) was the author of Alice in Wonderland" clearly means
something different than "Joe wondered if Lewis Carroll was Lewis Carroll",
as the latter but not the former points to a tautology. So when the name
changes, so does the meaning; ame object, but different names leads to a
different meaning. Another example involves Ben Franklin, another Hesperus
and Phosphorus. (Interestingly, these are questions about names, meaning,
and knowledge, not about the objects themselves existing independently of
perception.)
So it seems like there are problems with both Leibniz' Law and
substitutivity (taken at least by some to be equivalent). The confusion, I
think, stems from a misunderstanding of '=' and identity.
Notes from Leonard Linsky's Substitutivity:
Leibniz's Law (aka principle of substitutivity aka indiscernibility of
identicals): given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be
substituted for the other in any true statment and the result will be true.
According to Linsky (and I agree), this law is false in everyday language. A
number of examples follow: "Smith knows that Venus is the morning star" may
be true while "Smith knows that Venus is the evening star" may be false,
even though "the morning star is the evening star" is a true statement of
identity. Similarly with "Cicero is Tully" and "'Cicero' is spelled with
six letters." And similarly with Russell's puzzle as to why it doesn't
follow from the premise that Scott was the author of Waverley that George IV
wished to know whether Scott was Scott since he wished to know whether Scott
was the author of Waverley.
Linsky offers an example as a receptionist for the president. The
difference, according to Carnap et al, is in propositional attitude.
Another arguments are against vagueness or reference ('Cicero' neq Cicero).
Here's another example from which I think it follows that 'is' need not be
the is of identity: LBJ is the POTUS; the POTUS is elected every 4 years;
thereofre the LBJ is elected every 4 years.
*****
(3) In his paper "Four-Dimensionalism", van Inwagen offerers the following
(almost embarrassingly simple) argument against the doctrine of temporal
parts:
"If [four-dimensionalism] is correct, then Descartes is composed of
temporal parts, and all temporal parts are modally inductile. But
Descartes himself is one of his temporal parts -- the largest one, the sum
of all of them. But the (sic?) Descartes himself is modally inductile,
which means he could not have had a temporal extent greater than 54 years.
But this is obviously false, and [four-dimensionalism] is therefore
wrong.".
Is this a good argument? Is there a good argument for temporal parts?
(See van Inwagen, Lombard, and maybe Loux)
Peter van Inwagen, Four Dimensional Objects, pp9-12:
How can the proposition "It might have been the case that Descartes might
have lived more than or less than 54 years" be true if the name 'Descartes'
refers to a 4D object made up of temporal parts? Descartes must have
different temporal extents in different possible worlds. One must maintain
that temporal parts are modally inductile and modally incompressable. But
then Descartes himself is modally inductile (could not have had a longer
life) and this is false. van Inwagen thinks a 4Dist must adopt a
counterpart relation about modal statements (as well as one about temporal
parts). "An object in some other world will count as a temporal-part
counterpart of X only if it has the same temporal extent as X..." (p11).
When we say Descartes is the merelogical (part-whole) sum/union of his
temporal parts, we mean just the same thing as when we say he is the sum of
his spatial (body) parts. Just as we could have Descartes without an arm or
Descartes with 11 fingers, we could have Descartes who lived a year more or
less.
I suspect van Inwagen's argument is misunderstanding parts. If we take
temporal parts to only be proper subsets of the 4D Descartes object, we
don't have this problem. According to 4D/temporal parts theories,
Descartes-at-time-t (or range t1 to t2) is not a 3D object in the way one
might intuitively assume. To talk of Descartes-at-time-t as the same kind
of object as Descartes doesn't make sense; Descartes-at-time-t is a part of
Descartes. (Not sure if this is relevant or even if I am making sense.)
Or maybe the problem is not one of time but of modality? (Say more.)
Either way, I am unconvinced by Inwagen's argument.
There are two typical views of persistence, endurantism and perdurantism.
The most familiar is endurantism - for a concrete particular to persist
through time is for it to exist wholly at different times. The particular
is a 3D object. Perdurantism holds that endurantism is false; particulars
are made up of temproral parts (or stages or slices) each of which exists at
its own time. A particular tree, for instance, isn't at this moment wholly
existent; the now-stage of it is. The tree itself is actually the sum of
all the trees it was, is, and will be. "This tree" refers to this tree last
month (with leaves), yesterday (several tree cells different), today, and
tomorrow (with a branch chopped off of it).
The appeal of this approach is that it allows for us to explain persistence
through change without contradiction Leibniz's law (which says that if A and
B have different properties than they are not the same). That is, it allows
us to say "The tree without leaves is the same (tree) as the tree with
leaves." Which is something we want to say (otherwise we get into a horrible
muddle talking about anything; example: "I went to the store yesterday" "No
you didn't, that wasn't you, so someone else went to the store" "No, *I*
went to the store yesterday" ...). The problem with endurantism is that if
in order to persist an object must exist wholly at different times, then (it
seems) we have to say that the tree without leaves is not the same tree as
the tree with leaves. And this is crazy.
Now, there may be a way to save endurantism without resorting to 4D
(space-time) objects. We can time-index all properties; for example "This
tree which has the property of having-no-leaves-now also has the property of
having-had-leaves-last-month." Is there still then a good reason to think
about 4D particulars?
Are there any real problems with 4D? I think, in spite of all of the
criticism to the contrary, that temporal parts (four-dimensionalism,
perdurance) offers a better account for persistence through change than
three-dimensionalism (endurance). How can an object undergo change and be
after the change one and the same as the object before change? Maybe we can
answer this with endurance, saying the object exists wholly at all times by
getting rid of Leibniz' law (which I'm willing to do). Or we could just go
with 4D and say that, for example, Mark Heller persists through perdurances;
by being Little Markie at one point and Dr Mark at another, where LM and DM
are just parts of Heller.
Perdurantism has been recommended on the grounds that (1) it solves problems
of material constitution, (2) is suggested by relativity, (3) is the only
view that makes sense of change, (4) is the only view consistent with Humean
supervenience, and (5) makes better sense with regard to fission.
*****
(4) Actualism is the view that only actual objects exist. Presentism is the
view that only the present time and its contents exist. Can an actualist
allow that we refer to merely possible objects? Can a presentist allow that
we refer to objects in the past?
(See Loux, 220+, jstor, stanford, barcan formula?, linksy & zalta 1994?,
Adams 1974?)
Two views of modality and possible worlds are actualism (often associated
with Plantinga) and possiblism (often associated with Lewis). According to
actualism, only actual objects exist (and transworld individuals are fine).
According to possiblism, possible objects exist (worldbound indivdiuals).
Presentism and eternalism, two opposing views in temporal theory are often
seen to correspond to actualism and possiblism respectively (although they
need not exactly correspond). According to presentism, only the present is
real, while according to the eternalism all times are real.
Actualism --- everything that can be said to exist, exists actually or is
actual (in contrast with possibilism). The possibilist challenge to
actualism is to give an analysis of possibility without appeal to possible
but nonactual objects. Consider "There could be a planet disturbing the
orbit of Pluto and it could have a period of n years."
(Note: I'm not sure "possibly (there exists x such that x is an alien)" can
be redistributed to "there exists x which is possibly an alien" as the
possibilist suggests because if you take the there exists x out of the scope
of possibility, you have a different domain of objects for Krypke's QML.
Ah... it can't; that is the actualist's reply. And it comes at the price of
the loss of free variables and the inability it seems to speak of contingent
beings.)
Specific ways to speak of possible objects: perhaps some sort of
counterpart following Lewis, (1) Plantinga (individual essences) ---
coexemplification and individual essences; P and Q are coexemplified in w
just in case if w were actual P and Q would be coexemplified. (See
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism/actualist-problems.html) (2)
Adams (world stories) --- a world story is a maximally possible set of
propositions, and a proposition is possible just in case it is true in osome
world story. So possibly there exists x such that Ax is true just in case
there is a world in which Ax is true (isn't this the same as possibly Ax).
Fine has a similar but perhaps more successful account. (3) The possibilist
can accept "There is an x at world w" just as long as x is nonconcrete
(seems like a thinly veiled possibilism).
*****
(5) Are properties universals or particulars? Are they concrete or
abstract? Do they exist at all? Justify your answers.
(see Loux, stanford, tropes)
To say that properties are universals is to say that the selfsame property
can be instantiated by numerically distinct things. The competing view is
that properties are just as much individuals or particulars as the things
that have them. No matter how similar the colors of the two apples, their
colors are numerically distinct properties, the redness of the first apple
and the redness of the second. See for example trope theory, abstract
particulars. According to realists, there are universal properties;
according to trope theorists particular properties. According to the former
properties are instantiated and can be in different things.
I think properties are abstract (not sure how I would support this claim
though). Some properties seem to exemplify themselves; if properties are
abstract objects, then the property of being abstract should itself
exemplify the property of being abstract (huh?). See also Linsky and Zalta.
Abstract objects are correlated with collections of properties.
Properties exist (depending on what we mean by existence). The existence
condition for abstract objects is given by a comprehension schema according
to which there is (necessarily) a unique abstract object that encodes just
those properties satisfying each condition on properties specifiable in the
language of the theory, and abstract objects are identical just in case they
encode exactly the same properties. Views on existence include minimalism,
maximalism, centrist, and dual-entity accounts (again, see stanford).
*****
(6) Many metaphysics problems (free will, endurance vs perdurance,
nominalism vs realism) seem insoluble. Some have suggested that their
insolubility is a result of one or another sort of relativity. State and
evaluate some representive (sic) versions of this idea.
*****
(7) Is there anything wrong with the following principle?
For every material object M, if R is the region of space occupied by M at
time t, and if sub-R is an occupiable sub-region of R whatever, there
exists a material object that occupies the region sub-R at t.
(see Loux, Wiggins, Rea)
Seems not to be a problem; can pick out an infinite number of overlapping
objects; just isn't useful for us to do so we typically don't.
But then isn't it crazy to say there are an infinite (uncountably infinite)
number of objects?
Might say only some occupiable sub-regions are occupied by objects. Or that
they are occupied by different kinds of things. (Parts rather than a
whole.)
Is house the same as house-minus? Tinkertoy house and a pile of wood. Is
house the same as house-minus? Tinkertoy house and a pile of wood.
Descartes-minus (from Loux)?
Tibbles and Tib (Tibbles the cat minus the tail) in Wiggins' Being in the
Same Place at the Same Time.
Locke, no two things should ever exist at the same time and place.
Wiggins, no two things of the same kind can occuply the same time and place.
*****
(8) State Quine's criterion for ontological commitment. What reasons have
philosophers given for accepting it? What reasons have philosophers given
for denying it? Explain.
(See Quine's On What There Is and other pieces in part 1 of anthology)
"To be is to be the value of a bound variable." That is, a sentence is
committed to the existence of an entity if there is a name for the entity or
the sentence has an existential generalization where the entity is needed to
be the value of the bound variable.
Quine allows for us to rephrase away nonexistent objects such as Pegasus by
instead referring to the verb "pegasizes" (following Russell). One can also
rephrase into adverbs such as "Jones saw redly".
Worries: status of paraphrase, adequacy in capturing ontological concerns,
inscrutability of reference. How far can paraphase go in eliminating
ontological commitments? Might we be left with no commitments? Another
worry about paraphrase is that a paraphrase is either equivalent to or a
replacement of the original. If they are equivalent, how can one commit us
to Pegasus (for example) while the other does not? If they aren't
equivalent, then how is the truth preserved? Furthermore, Quine himself
expresses the problem of inscrutability of reference (see Quine; consider
also meaning vs reference).
*****
(9) It has sometimes been said that all there is to say about the truth is
what is said by sentences of the form: A is true iff p, where A is a name of
the sentence p. Compare a view of truth according to which this is so with
a view of truth that denies it. Evaluate.
(See Loux realism and antirealism, Dummett, Putnam)
Question is whether there is a mind-independent world or whether we can only
view the world through the filter of our thoughts/language and that's all
there is.
Realism: there is a mind-independent world about which we form beliefs and
make statements; beliefs/statements are true just in case they correspond to
the world they are about.
It is true that S if and only if S. (Realism)
Anti-Realists include: idealists, Berkeley (extenral world is in minds of
perceivers), Kant (things as they appear to us are constituted in part by
our ways of experiencing them), pragmaticist who rely on epistemological
concepts like evidence. Reason anti-Realist trends rely on the philosophy
of language.
epistemic theory of meaning --- to know the meaning of a statement is to
know what whould constitute justification for the statement. Dummett says
Realism fails to provide an adequte account of the meaning of undecidable
statements.
What about possible worlds; true if it obtains.
Quine and inscrutibility of reference (gavagai). Putnam extends this to
show that the Realist relies on word-world relations, but such relations
aren't there.
*****
(10) What is the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic properties and
internal and external relations?
(See stanford, loux?, yablo, lewis)
Properties are monadic (one-place) whereas relations are polyadic ("E is
north of L") Extrinsic properties/relations are those relate to other
things; intrisic properties are had by the objects themselves independently
of externals. For example, mass could be considered intrinsic while weight
is extrinsic.
Lewis: extrinsic properties may be thought of in two ways: as genuine
indexed properties ("has five fingers in this world", "has leaves at time
t") or as disguised relations (any contingent or time-dependent properties).
(tangents: are the accidental intrinsics? relational intrinsics? How
about "having longer legs than arms"? primary vs secondary qualities and
epistemology?)
A thing *has* its properties, even if having them (as with extrinsic
properties) requires another object; a relation requires two things, even if
they may both (as with internal relations) be parts of the same object.
Extrinsic properties are sometimes taken to be relations.
Internal relations are those which are had essentially/necessarily; external
relations are those which are had accidentally/contingently.
Bliss: some relations: part-whole, subject-object; there can be no entity
without relations; in entities having parts there must be relations among
the parts; there can be no composite entity without internal and
constitutive relations.
*****
(11) Is there a "necessary connection" between causes and effects? Explain.
(See Hume, Treatise, 1.3.14.20+, 2.3.1.16, necessary connexion, stanford, also Essay on
Human Understanding, and maybe Locke and powers)
Considering a single cause and effect we find conjunction, but not
connection. Somehow from the repetition of conjunctions we find a
connection from habit and a feeling of determination. Hume defines cause
(EHU 76) "an object, followed by another, and where all objects similar to
the first are followed by objects similar to the second" and (EHU 77) "an
object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought
of that other". For Hume, it is experience which taaches us of cause and
effect, not a priori reasoning. Three principles of connexion: resemblance,
contiguity, cause and effect.
When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation
of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or
necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and
renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that
the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one
billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that
appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward
impression from this succession of objects: consequently, there is not, in
any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can
suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.
From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what
effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause
discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without
experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by
mere dint of thought and reasoning.
We know that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame; but what is
the connexion between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture or
imagine. It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived
from the contemplation of bodies, in single instances of their operation;
because no bodies ever discover any power, which can be the original of this
idea.
Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to the senses, give us no
idea of power or necessary connexion, by their operation in particular
instances, let us see, whether this idea be derived from reflection on the
operations of our own minds, and be copied from any internal impression.
They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance
of the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant,
and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it.
But philosophers, who carry their scrutiny a little farther, immediately
perceive that, even in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is
as unintelligible as in the most unusual, and that we only learn by
experience the frequent Conjunction of objects, without being ever able to
comprehend anything like Connexion between them. They pretend that those
objects which are commonly denominated causes, are in reality nothing but
occasions.
All those objects, of which we call the one cause and the other effect,
consider'd in themselves, are as distinct and separate from each other, as
any two things in nature, nor can we ever, by the most accurate survey of
them, infer the existence of the one from that of the other. 'Tis only from
experience and hte observation of their constant union, that we are able to
form this inference; and even after all, the inference is nothing but the
effects of custom on the imagination. We must not here be content with
saying, that the idea of cause and effects arises from objects constantly
united; but must affirm, that'tis the very same with the conclusion of the
understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind. Wherever, therefore,
we observe the same union, and wherever the union operates in the same
manner upon the belief and opinion, we have the idea of causes and
necessity, tho' perhaps we may avoid those expressions. Motion in one body
in all past instances, that have fallen under our observation, is follow'd
upon impulse by motion in another. 'Tis impossible for the mind to
penetrate farther. From this constant union it forms the idea of cause and
effect, and by its influence feels the necessity.
*****
(12) Is there any sense in which free action and determinism are
incompatible? Is there any sense in which they are compatible? Justify
your answers.
(see Dennett, Hume, Locke?, wikipedia)
Determinism --- the state of the universe at any time is the consequence of
the state of the universe at an earlier point in time.
Three options: either everything is determined so there is no free will, or
not everything is determined (libertarianism), or determinism is compatible
with free will (compatibilism). Focus on the third.
Moore: to say that one chooses freely is to say that one could have done
otherwise. Alt def: to choose freely is to choose without compulsion.
Another alt: to choose freely is to choose following rational deliberation.
Note: one problem with non-compatible views is the same to take free will as
following from randomness. This is Ayer's argument: either an action is
unexplicable/random/accidental or it is not. If it is accidental then
freedom for moral responsibility does not follow. Ayer says one is free if
their actions are unconstrained. Stace defines free acts to be those
immediately caused by the (psych of the) agent. Note: if punishment is to
be a deterrent it must play a role in determining action.
Freedom does not mean undetermined but rather unconstrained (Searle);
another compatibilist was Hume (agent determination). "If you make yourself
really small you can externalize everything."
I think I'm a compatibilist. Determinism need not imply lack of free will,
although there are reasons why one might think it does. Support this
somehow.
Argument for incompatibilism is the argument from unavoiability
(inevitability): if determinism is such that certain things are unavoidable,
then how can we have freedom?
(Question: what does Locke say about someone locked in a room he wants to be
in, freedom/liberty)