Week 2
Russell and Parsons (1) In the excerpt, "Existence and Description", Russell makes the following paradoxical-sounding statement: "To say that [the actual things in the world] do not exist is strictly nonsense, but to say that they do exist is also strictly nonsense." [p.25]. Explain what Russell has in mind. Russell refers to "the actual things in the world", but doesn't give any examples. Are there any actual things in the world? If not, the premise is false, so all conclusions are true. The phrase "actual things in the world" really means "all actual things in the world", and this is meaningless (though not necessarily nonsense) statement if there aren't any actual things. One can speak of a class (like that of actual things) without knowing anything about members of the class. Similarly, properties of a class are not necessarily true of instances of the class, and it is a fallacy to allow instances (particular actual things) to inherit the properties of the class of all actual things. The paradox is only apparent. "All actual things existing" and "all actual things not existing" are not contradictories any more than "Socrates is mortal" and "Socrates is immortal" are (in both cases Socrates exists). (2) Describe, in general terms, what the theory of non-existent objects offered by Terence Parsons in "Referring to Non-Existent Objects" has to say about sentences like "Sherlock Holmes was a detective". "Sherlock Holmes was a detective" is a sentence that could easily be understood in ordinary language, even by people who know that Holmes is a fictional character. Being a detective is part of a description of the character referred to as Sherlock Holmes. According to Parsons, the statement "Sherlock Holmes was a detective" is true. Sherlock Holmes is an object that satisfies the property "is a detective". The statement "Sherlock Holmes was a detective and Sherlock Holmes is real", on the other hand, is false. But just as there is nothing contradictory about considering unreal gold mountais, we can say that the Holmes was a detective and that he doesn't (and didn't) exist. What does it mean to talk about a non-existent object? Unlike existing objects, the object Holmes need not be complete; that is, Holmes can be indeterminate with respect to some properties. Holmes, though non-existent can be a possible object; that is, there is nothing paradoxical about the object Holmes the way there is something inconsistent about a round square.
Week 3
Quine (1) What is Quine's thesis concerning the indeterminacy of meaning or translation? Certain expressions have multiple translations from one language to another, where no one translation is *the* correct translation. One example is the translation of "ne ... rien" from French to English. (2) What is Quine's thesis concerning the inscrutability of reference and how is this second thesis related to the one discussed in (1)? Reference may also be indeterminate because it can be unclear what is being referred to. Examples include "gavagai", the Japanese "five oxen", and the problem of referring to grass to communicate the word "green" abstractly through deferred ostension. Again, there is no single correct one-to-one mapping between objects/expressions in two different languages. (3) What is Quine's position concerning Carnap's distinction between "internal" and "external questions"? Internal questions are those about theories within a world or linguistic framework, whereas external questions are those about the theories themselves. Quine sees no advantage to this terminology and concludes that such a distinction will not clarify ontological relativity. Instead, Quine points to circularity and meaning in a relative sense. (4) In what sense is Quine a relativist concerning matters of ontology? Ontology, says Quine, is relative in two ways: first, reference makes sense only relative to the background theory/language; second, ontology is relative to the choice of translation (proxy function) from within one universe/language to another.
Week 4
Black and Kripke (1) What is the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles? At its most basic, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles says that different things are different or discernible. In two hypothetical objects are indiscernible, they are in fact identical or the same thing. (2) Explain Black's example involving Castor and Pollux. Speaker A supposes that two exactly similar spheres are named "Castor" and "Pollux". Then the two spheres must differ in (among other ways) that one is a certain distance from Castor whereas the other is that distance from Pollux, so they cannot be identical. Speaker B objects on a number of grounds, including that there is no one in the universe to name the spheres and that if there were someone he/she would have no way to distinguish between the two spheres for the purpose of naming them. (3) What would it mean for an identity-statement to be contingent? A statement is contingent (or contingently true) if it could have been otherwise. In other words, a statement "p" is contingent if "possibly not p" is true. (This is equivalent to "not necessarily p".) "The first Postmaster General of the US is identical with the inventor of bifocals" is a contingent identity-statement. (4) What is Kripke's distinction between 'rigid' and 'non-rigid designators'? A "rigid designator" is a term that designates the same object in all possible worlds. A "non-rigid designator" refers to an object that could have been different. "The inventor of bifocals" is a non-rigid designator, because it is not necessarily the case that Franklin invented bifocals.
Week 5
Perry (1) Describe the view (defended by Peter Geach) which Perry is attacking. Perry attacks Geach's view that identity is relative. Geach claims that it makes no sense to say that two things are just "the same", whereas it does makes sense to say "the same F" or "the same with respect to the property F". (2) What is the view that is being ascribed to Frege? Perry believes Frege's view is that general terms do not identify the kind of identity, but rather they identify (restrict) the referents. That is, all identity relations can be broken up into a more general relation and a restriction (much as the relation "is the left-handed brother of" is equivalent to the relation "is the brother of" with the referent restricted to left-handed ones). (3) Explain what Perry means by saying on p.96: "But as far as I can see, nothing more objectionable than families would emerge from this reinterpretation." Geach, bothered by such expressions as "the set of objects where all members of the set are blue", introduces androids and surmen in order to have individuals represent groups. Perry does not (nor do I) share Geach's sense that there is something problematic about attributing properties to families, or classes, of objects.
Week 6
Gibbard (1) Where exactly does Gibbard take himself to disagree with Kripke? And which of Kripke's claims remain unaffected by Gibbard's claims? Gibbard's claim is that there is such a thing as contingent (non-necessary) identity. For Kripke, there can be no contingent identities consisting of proper names; proper names are always rigid designators. (2) Describe the kind of case Gibbard takes to be an example of a contingent identity. Gibbard claims that a piece of clay (Lumpl) and a statue (Goliath) may be (but are not necessarily) the same. For the clay and the statue to be identical, they must share all properties, including being created and destroyed at the same times. These temporal properties could have been otherwise because the piece of clay could easily have existed before and/or after the form of the statue. (3) How does Gibbard propose to address the objection involving Leibniz's Law addressed in Section V (p.107)? In answering this question, please also state clearly what the objection is meant to be. Gibbard makes the claim that Goliath and Lumpl are contingently identical, but according to Leibniz' Law, this cannot be because if Lumpl=Goliath (and therefore can be substituted) then it is a necessary fact that the existence of Lumpl implies that Goliath=Lumpl. Gibbard's response is that substitutivity of identicals is here being misused and is intended to apply to properties and relations, not for objects. (4) What are the costs incurred by subscribing to a view of the kind Gibbard proposes? Gibbard's view of contingent identity is incompatible with the notion of de re modality for concrete things and may leave us without any sensible way to say many of the things that we may want to say (such as those about cross-world identity).
Week 7
Yablo (1) Is Yablo's use of the term 'contingent identity' the same or different from that of Gibbard? Contingent identity for Gibbard meant that two things are identical but could have been different in other worlds. Contingent identity for Yablo means categorical indiscernibility, or that the two things have all the same categorical properties in a world. (2) What are Yablo's main examples which (in his view) exhibit the relation he calls contingent identity? Yablo's examples of contingent identity include driving and speeding home (speeding is essentially done at high speed whereas driving only happens to be at high speed and could have been done otherwise), the Cloth and the Shroud of Turin, and a bust of Aristotle and a hunk of wax. (3) What is the doctrine Yablo calls 'essentialism'? Essentialism is a theory about essences; the essence of a thing is the set of properties that the thing necessarily (essentially) possesses. (4) What is the connection between what he calls 'contingent identity' and the doctrine of essentialism? Essentialism seems to prohibit contingent identity because the essence of an object is that which is necessary or cannot be otherwise. But Yablo claims that essentialism requires contingent identity to include identity-like connections (composes, instantiates, comprises). (5) What is the relation between Cloth and Shroud, according to Yablo? (6) What is the status of what he calls 'identity-properties'? (7) Explain what Yablo means by the terms 'cumulative property' and 'restrictive property'. Identity properties (such as "is identical with the Cloth of Turin") are dependent on all other properties. Restrictive properties, such as identity properties, restrict the essence of one thing from containing the essence of another. Cumulative properties are those properties that can be contained in the essence of another thing. For example, the Shroud of Turn contains all of the cumulative properties of the Cloth of Turin and the additional property that it enshrouded Jesus. (8) What does Yablo mean by 'categorical property' and 'hypothetical property'? Categorical properties involve how things happen to obtain in a particular world (intra-world). Hypothetical properties are those involving how things could or would have been given different circumstances (trans-world).
Week 8
Plantinga and Chisholm (1) Give some examples to illustrate the distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Necessary truths include logical truths, such as "A or not A", as well as truths like "17+17=34" and "yellow is a color". In contrast, non-necessary or contingent truths include ones like "this pig is pink", and even some truths which are causal necessary such as "pigs cannot fly". (2) What is the distinction between logical necessity and causal (natural) necessity? The statement "pigs cannot fly" is a causal or natural necessity; that is, it is implausible in our world. But it is possible in some sense (the logical sense) that flying pigs are non-contradictory or possible, so the statement "pigs cannot fly" is not a logical necessity. (3) What is the distinction between the necessary and contingent, on the one hand, and the unrevisable, the self-evident, the a priori and the a posteriori, on the other hand? Unrevisability, self-evidence, and a priori knowledge are all different from necessity. Unrevisability has to do with propositions that we are unwilling to give up. (Quine (among others) says that nothing is immune from revision, meaning that we can always construct alternate scenarios by revising one proposition and modifying others accordingly.) Necessary propositions are not immune to revisability, so revisability does not help us to separate necessary propositions from contingent ones. Moving on to two epistemological concepts: Self-evident or obvious propositions may be contingent, and some necessary propositions are not self-evident (for example, Goldbach's conjecture). Similarly, propositions may be necessary (or even knowable) but not known a priori (or even known at all). (4) What is the distinction between de re and de dicto modality? de re modality applies to objects, whereas de dicto modality applies to propositions. "Seventeen is necessarily prime" is an example of the former category, while "Necessarily seventeen is prime" is an example of the latter. (de re modality seems to be the more philosophically problematic of the two.) (5) What is essentialism? According to essentialism, some objects have some properties essentially (necessarily) and others accidentally. (6) What is Kneale's objection to essentialism supposed to be? Kneale claims that the necessity (or contingency) of an object having particular properties is necessity (or contingency) relative to a certain description. Plantinga believes Kneale takes de re assertions to be a shorthand representing de dicto assertions. (7) What is Quine's worry about essentialism? Quine explores the contradictions that arise when the following are interpreted de re (rather than de dicto): Mathematicians are necessarily rational but not necessarily bipedal; cyclists are necessarily bipedal but not necessarily rational; there is someone who is both a mathematician and a cyclist. (8) Briefly summarize the problem Chisholm is trying to raise for de re modality. Chisholm explores the paradoxical problems that arise from the idea that an object might be in several possible worlds so identical with objects in other worlds. To illustrate these problems, he considers possible worlds inhabited by Adam and Noah, where the Adam of one world is indiscernible from the Noah of another.
Week 9
Lewis (i) Explain the notion of overlap. Overlap involves the idea that part of one world might be contained in another world (for example, the possibility of the same Humphrey being in two worlds) or that one entity could be in multiple worlds (much as one highway can have parts in several states). (ii) What is Lewis' view on trans-world identity? Lewis subscribes to a restricted sort of trans-world identity (for example, any universals could have trans-world identity) but that trans-world individuals, as often understood in the sense of overlap of worlds, are impossible. Instead, Lewis clarifies a distinction between possible individuals in a world and the mereological sum of individuals (the union of all possibilities for a given individual or of counterparts), and claims that trans-world individuals of this latter, type are possible. (iii) What is the so-called problem of accidental intrinsics? If one individual (indiscernible identity) is to be in multiple worlds, Lewis explains, it does not make sense for that individual to have different contingent or accidental properties in different worlds. (iv) Is it true according to Lewis that I could have been a poached egg? You are essentially human if and only if there is no counterpart of you (who could be part of the mereological sum of instantiations of you) who could have been a poached egg. (v) Is Lewis a contingent identity theorist? Yes, on Lewis's terms (but no, on the terms of many others). His theory is a counterpart theory where one individual has multiple contingent instantiations.
Week 10
Adams and Armstrong (1) What does Adams mean by 'primitive thisness', as opposed to a 'suchness'? Thisnesses and non-qualitative involve particulars, whereas suchnesses are qualitative and do not. Adams gives as an example that owning a particular house is a thisness but the property of owning any house is a suchness. Adams claims that primitive thisnesses are needed and that thisnesses are not an instantiation of, a composition of, or otherwise dependent on suchnesses. (2) What is the position Adams associates with Leibniz? According to Adams, Leibniz's position is that thisnesses are a particular kind of suchness. That is, only qualitative concepts are needed to analyze the terms of propositions. (3) Why does Adams believe that we need primitive thisnesses? Adams uses primitive thisnesses to support primitive trans-world identity. (4) Can Armstrong's combinatorialism capture all the facts about de re representation that need to be captured? Armstrong's theory of possible worlds as being all possible (molecular) combinations of simple atoms (individuals, properties, and relations) may run into the problem that there are neither alien individuals (haecceitism) or alien universals (quidditism). From the actual world, any reductions of ther actual world (i.e., removal of an individual) is contingent, but from an already contracted world, an expension would lead to the addition of something alien and so is impossible.
Week 11
Adams and Loux (1) Although Adams holds that primitive thisness provides a plausible argument for primitive identity, the two notions are not equivalent and are not necessarily connected. To show that primitive thisness does not entail primitive identity, he uses the example of Indi and Scerni. To show that primitive identity does not entail primitive thisness, he uses the example of Leibniz who (in his view) held that very combination of views. Explain why the notion of primitive thisness is not equivalent to that of primitive identity by showing that the former does not entail the latter and vice versa. Adams' example of Indi and Scerni shows that primitive thisness does not entail primitive identity because the example relies on transtemporal identity, which Adams does not believe to be primitive. That is, Adams claims that primitive thisness does not imply primitive transtemporal identity (and hence not primitive identity). Primitive identity does not imply primitive thisness because, for example, an individual that is tasting an olive may be identical with one that is hearing a bird. (2) How is it possible, according to Adams, that there can be necessary connections between thisnesses and suchnesses without it being the case that thisness is reducible to suchness? Adams seems to suggest that we suppose that necessities de re are commonly synthetic, rather than require that necessary truths be analytic. (3) What are properties? Properties are attributes, qualities, features, and characteristics of things. For some realists, properties are all monadic universals, while others distinguish between properties and kinds. (Objects exemplify properties by possessing them; things exemplify kinds by belonging to them.) Properties are sometime considered to include relations and multi-place predicates. (4) What is realism? Realists are those who believe that universals exist. That is, when objects are similar, there is some (existing) way in which they are similar. Plato is considered to be a realist. (5) What is nominalism? Nominalists are those who deny that universals exist and hope to offer a simpler theory without universals. Nominalism is further divided into austere nominalism (only concrete particulars), metalinguistic nominalism (linguistic expressions rather than universals), and trope theory (attributes, properties, tropes). (6) What are universals? Universals are entities that can be exemplified by different objects at the same time, such as ``redness'' and ``triangularity'' and ``being next to''. (7) What are particulars? Particulars are specific concrete objects, such as people, animals, plants, and other material objects. (8) What are the main arguments for realism about properties? According to the realist, properties are universals, and perhaps conjunctions and negations of universals. It is then possible for two different objects to exemplify the same universal. Some realists, the Platonists, believe that properties include universals that will never (either contingently or necessarily) be exemplified, such as the property of round-squareness (or being both round and a square). (9) What are the main arguments for nominalism about properties? Nominalists deny that there are properties that can be instantiated in many different particulars. Properties are individuals or particulars, not universals. Universals exist for the sake of language and thought, but there is no such thing as, say the universal ``redness''. According to austere nominalists, claims involving properties are claims about concrete particulars rather than universals. Such a nominalist reads the proposition ``Red is a color'' as an abbreviation for ``Red objects are colored objects.'' According to trope theory, properties or attributes are themselves particulars, not universals. According to Carnap, talk about properties is actually talk about a general term. Nominalists believe that their account is simpler because they are not committed to an ontology of properties and particulars.
Week 12
Part I -- Armstrong: (1) In what sense, according to Armstrong, are universals located in particulars? Particulars instantiate universals. (2) Explain Armstrong's distinction between 'thin' and 'thick' particulars. Thick particulars are states of affairs involving properties. Thing particulars are property-less. Thin particulars are only related to properties through instantiation. (3) What is the Principle of Instantiation? Armstrong assumes the Principle of Instantiation which (in contrast to the Platonist view) says that every universal must be instantiated (at some point in time). (4) For which predicates is there a corresponding universal? There are no uninstantiated universals. In addition, there are no universals corresponding to disjunctive or negated properties. There are, however, universals corresponding to conjunctions. (5) Why are states of affairs needed in addition to particulars and universals? The existence of an an object a, a property F, and instantiation does not amount to that object a being F. For every contingent truth, there must be says Armstrong, something in the world which makes it true. (6) What are structural universals? Structural universals are those involving the instantiation of a certain structure (such as the way parts of a flag fit together to make the flag). Part II -- Lewis: (7) What, according to Lewis, is the work to be done by universals or their substitutes? Universals (or natural properties) are employed by Lewis to explain duplication (worlds that are indiscernible), supervenience, and divergent worlds (worlds sharing a common initial segment), materialism (under some restriction any two worlds that are exactly alike physically are identical), laws and causation, and the content of language and thought. (8) What is a natural property? Natural properties are the subset of properties which would be universals (if there were universals). Physics takes as its aim to give a inventory of natural properties. According to Lewis, two things are qualitative duplicates if they have exactly the same perfectly natural properties. (9) What is the difference, according to Lewis, between universals and properties? Universals are wholly present wherever they are instantiated, whereas properties are spread around or made up of their instantiations. Universals are sparse (a minimal basis) whereas universals are abundant. (10) What is the One Over Many Problem? (11) What's a 'Moorean' fact? The One Over Many Problem is that the fact of sameness of type is an undeniable (Moorean) fact. A Moorean fact is one that contradicts common sense. (12) Why is the notion of a duplicate important in philosophy? Duplication is important because it is required to understand both supervenience and divergent worlds.
Week 13
(1) What is a 'Cambridge change'? "Cambridge change" is a term from Geach meaning that an object x has changed if there is some F where F(x) is true at some time and false at another. Mere-Cambridge changes (and properties) are distinguished from genuine ones as follows: Mere-Cambridge changes are typically relative changes rather than changes in the object itself (Socrates getting shorter relative to someone else because the other person has gotten taller) whereas genuine changes are those were the object itself changes. (2) What does the term 'dispositional' mean, according to Shoemaker, and to what does it apply? Dispositional predicates represent particular change in possible circumstances. Dispositional predicates include "flexible" and "poisonous" whereas nondispositional predicates include "square" and "made of copper". (3) What is a 'power'? A power is (loosely) a potential or a possibility. Something has a power if there are possible circumstances which will lead to particular effects. Powers depend on nondispositional properties. (If something is poisonous it will under certain circumstances produce death or illness.) (4) What are Shoemaker's 'broadly speaking epistemological' reasons for holding his theory of properties? Shoemaker believes in a relation between powers and predicates (and causal effects). His motivation is that properties are recognized by their effects, by the effects of events arising from causal powers. A causal theory of properties, then, is needed. (5) What can Shoemaker's account of properties accomplish for us? Shoemaker's argument establishes a connection between the identity of a property and its causal potentialities. (6) Does Shoemaker's account suffer from a fatal circularity? According to Shoemaker, there is no fatal circularity in the fact that the notion of a properties is reduced to terms of notions of causality and that mere-Cambridge powers cannot be explained without the notion of genuine properties. (7) What is the relation between causal necessity and logical necessity, according to Shoemaker? Causal necessity is a subset of logical necessity.