2. Some might say, "There is admittedly some difference between 'the first person perspective' and 'the third person perspective'. But the difference is without consequence for epistemology. There is nothing we can know from the first person perspective which is unknowable from the third. There is no significant immunity from error which the first person perspective enjoys over the third. It is true that it is easier to gain warrant for certain claims (like the claim that one is in pain) from the first person perspective. But it is likewise easier to gain warrant for certain other claims (like the claim that the Antarctic is icy) from the 'South Pole perspective'. No one thinks that this makes a pilgrimage to Antarctica mandatory for budding G. E. Moores." Of what significance is the first person perspective to the theory of knowledge?
3. Some philosophers think that 'know' is a word which shifts in its standards according to the context in which it is used. Discuss this claim, and the possibility of using it as tool for undermining skeptical positions about knowledge.
4. It is sometimes held that skepticism is true (or at least irrefutable), that it involves the same kind of epistemic assessment that we carry out in our everyday lives, and that it has no practical import. Is this position consistent, given that our ordinary epistemic assessments do normally have practical import? If not, which of the claims should be abandoned?
5. What are some of the main examples of Gettier problems? Is there a plausible way of handling them? Does it matter if there isn't?
6. What are the doctrines of foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology? What are the best arguments for and against each one? Which has the stronger support? Is there any third alternative?
7. What could count as evidence for the existence of innate knowledge?
8. What, if any, are the differences in goals, methods, and background assumptions between philosophical theory of knowledge and empirical psychology of cognitive processes? What, if anything, can either enterprise contribute to the other?
9. Does science show that we never directly perceive physical objects?
10. Can a case be made out that Descartes was a "naturalized epistemologist"? Why or why not?
11. "Part of one's epistemic duty is to reflect critically upon one's beliefs, and such critical reflection precludes believing things to which one has, to one's knowledge, no reliable means of epistemic access." What is at stake in the view expressed here? Is the view correct? How would we explain our knowledge of mathematical objects on such a view?
12. C. D. Broad called the unsatisfactory state of Hume's problem of induction "the scandal of western philosophy". What is Hume's problem? Why is (or isn't) its state unsatisfactory?